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This thesis examines the statehood history of the
present-day states of North and South Dakota.

They were

part of the Territory of Dakota during the years 18611889, their ultimate division occurring only after a long
and bitter eighteen-year struggle.
The prime object of this thesis is to pinpoint precisely
the reasons why statehood for the Dakotas took so many years.
It seeks to determine who supported and who opposed admission,
both in Dakota Territory and in the United States Congress,
and investigates the reasons admission was so long delayed.
Specific investigation of the Fiftieth Congress, 1888-1889,
is necessary because it was this Congress that ultimately
allowed Dakota Territory to organize into two states, as set
forth in the Omnibus Bill.
Conventional methods were used to examine contemporary
and modern histories, pertinent documentary collections,
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congressional records, and territorial papers.

Quantitative

analysis, involving a study of roll-call materials was also
used,
Results proved that the Dakotans themselves contributed
to their statehood delays by fragmenting into segregated groups
lacking direction, rather than uniting behind a common goal.
They looked only after their own local or regional interests,
instead of those of the entire territory.

Secondly, partisan

ship was extremely strong in the Fiftieth Congress in Washing
ton,

Democrats and Republicans consistently voted along

precise party lines, doing exactly what the party leaders
apparently wanted.
poles resulted.

When it came to the statehood issue, two

Democrats formed a united front against the

possibility of new states, while Republicans fully supported
the admittance of new territories into the Union.
In conclusion, research indicates that Dakotans were
responsible to some degree for the long statehood delay
because of their disorganized program and suspicious attitude
toward other parts of the territory.

A second conclusion,

supported precisely by conventional and quantitative analysis,
shows that Republicans were promoters of statehood for the
territories and that Democrats were opposed.

This Thesis submitted by Julie Marvyl Andresen Koch
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota is
hereby approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee under
whom the work has been done.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the statehood history of the
present-day states of North and South Dakota.

They were

part of the Territory of Dakota during the years 18611889, their ultimate division occurring only after a long
and bitter eighteen-year struggle.

The prime objective of this thesis is to pinpoint
precisely the reasons why statehood for the Dakotas took
so many years.

It seeks to determine who supported and

who opposed admission, both in Dakota Territory and in
the United States Congress, and investigates the reasons
admission was so long delayed.

Specific investigation of

the Fiftieth Congress, 1888-1889, is necessary because it
was this Congress that ultimately allowed Dakota
Territory to organize into two states, set forth in the
Omnibus Bill.

Conventional methods were used to examine
contemporary and modern histories, pertinent documentary
collections, congressional records, and territorial
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papers.

Quantitative analysis, involving a study of roll-

call materials was also used.

Results proved that the Dakotans themselves
contributed to their statehood delays by fragmenting
into segregated groups lacking direction rather than
uniting behind a common goal.

They looked only after

their own local or regional interests, instead of those
of the entire territory.

Secondly, partisanship was

extremely strong in the Fiftieth Congress in Washington.
Democrats and Republicans consistently voted along
precise party lines, doing exactly what the party leaders
apparently wanted.
two poles resulted.

When it came to the statehood issue,
Democrats formed a united front

against the possibility of new states, while Republicans
fully supported the admittance of new territories into
the Union.

In conclusion, research indicates that Dakotans were
responsible to some degree for the long statehood delay
because of their disorganized program and suspicious
attitude toward other parts of the territory.

A second

conclusion, supported precisely by conventional and
quantitative analysis, show that Republicans were
promoters of statehood for the territories and that
Democrats were opposed.
vi i i

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The present-day states of North and South Dakota
were part of the Territory of Dakota during the years
1861-1889, their ultimate division occurring only after a
long and bitter eighteen-year struggle.

It was a time of

frustration, as Congress either ignored or belittled
numerous petitions, resolutions, and memorials supporting
statehood for Dakota Territory.

The early years, from

1861 to 1871, were relatively calm, with a concentrated
effort to settle and develop the area.

But thereafter,

the territorial inhabitants engaged in a constant
struggle to prove to Congress that they were able to take
control of their government and deserved statehood.
This paper traces the history of the statehood
movement.

It seeks to determine who supported and who

opposed admission, both in the Dakota Territory and in
the United States Congress, and investigates the reasons
admission was so long delayed.

Because of their initial

union, North and South Dakota cannot be discussed
separately; their beginnings are interwoven, with the
history of each state affecting the other.
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The prime objective of this thesis is to pinpoint
precisely the reasons why statehood for the Dakotas took
so many years.

There seems to be a considerable amount

of time between the initial memorials sent to the United
States Congress in 1871 and the final passage of the
Omnibus (statehood) Bill in 1889.

I intend to investi

gate the issues and events occurring in the territory
that seem to have delayed political action.

I will also

examine the United States House and Senate.

The legisla

tive action of Congress ultimately granted statehood, but
eighteen years' delay implies indifference.1

The long

period of territorial tutelage, from 1861 to 1889,
occurred when Gilded Age political partisanship was
intense.

Party loyalty caused some sympathic individ

uals, who favored statehood for the territories, to
forego their consciences and vote as the party dictated.
It is my contention that the main culprits in this
unfortunate situation appear to be Democrats.

Historio

graphy indicates that members of this party overlooked
glowing, favorable reports that arrived frequently from
the territory, disregarded continual memorials and
petitions, and chose to ignore individuals who came out
from Dakota to plead their cause.
The interpretation is basically correct in
attributing to the Democratic Party the long delay in
statehood for the Dakotas.

Even so, historians have
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underestimated the strength of these party views at the
point of actual passage, in the last session of the
Fiftieth Congress.

The positive role of the Democrats in

promoting statehood has also been slighted, perhaps
because roll-call voting behavior of Democratic congress
men indicates they were almost universally suspicious of
the notion that the two states should enter, while
Republicans were even more unanimous in favor of dual
statehood.

Furthermore, sectionalism (North versus South

or East versus West) played very little role in influ
encing attitudes, despite the fact that, on the surface
at least, statehood would always seem to raise a question
of eastern versus western influence and would always have
the effect of diluting eastern political power.

Section

was only important to the extent that the solid
Democratic South influenced the issue because of its
partisan, not sectional, point of view.

It will become

clear that Democrats were quite insensitive to the
statehood question and that Republicans, on the other
hand, staunchly supported it.

The conclusion seems

inescapable that Democrats were unfair to Dakota's
citizens in withholding deserved statehood.
The purpose of this paper is to define precisely the
role of the Democratic and Republican Parties in either
delaying or supporting statehood for the Territory of
Dakota.

Up to this point, common historical

interpretations of events during the territorial period
merely suggest that Republicans assisted the statehood
cause while Democrats blocked the addition of new
states.

The latter seriously believed that their

political power would be jeopardized by the addition of
new territories, especially those with strong Republican
ties as was the case with Dakota.

Therefore, they were

not going to nor did they assist any territorial entrance
into the Union which would alter party strength.

The

Republicans, on the opposite side, were naturally
supportive of the statehood issue given the political
complexion of the territory.

My hypothesis, therefore,

is that Democrats led Dakotans down a path lined with
false and unfilled promises and that Republicans
supported territorial ambitions— and yet, Democrats, some
of them at least, were ultimately responsible for the
passage of the statehood measure.
I intend to show that there were definite party
views in the Fiftieth Congress.

Democrats and

Republicans consistently voted along precise party lines,
doing exactly what the party leaders apparently wanted.
When it came to the statehood issue, two poles resulted.
Democrats formed a united front against the possibilty of
new states while Republicans fully supported the
admittance of new territories into the Union.

5

However, even though my hypothesis defines the Democratic
and Republican roles in the statehood issue, it is
nevertheless important to point out that Dakota entered
the Union during Fiftieth Congress, 1888-1889, which had
a Democratic majority in the house.

The Democrats,

however consistently against statehood for the
territories, actually brought in the new states.

This

was done only under extreme circumstances in the last few
months before the statehood bill passed.

It was only

after all avenues were closed and it became important to
"save face," that some Democrats came full circle and
suddenly supported statehood for the territories.

It is

ironic, as it turns out, that my hypothesis defining the
Democrats as non-supporters for statehood, actually seems
disproved on the surface by the passage of the Omnibus
(statehood) Bill by the Democratic House.

However, my

original hypothesis is nevertheless supported by both the
historiography of the period and by quantitative
research.

It will be clear that the Democratic Party

acted irresponsibly by not protecting the interests of
the unenfranchised citizens for many years, and that they
clearly prevented Dakota from entering the Union until
they were forced to change their program.
Another theme that recurs throughout this study is
the delay that seemed to plague the Territory of Dakota
throughout the period.

Much delay was caused by
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Democratic congressmen who refused to support statehood
even though all requirements were fulfilled; but Dakotans
themselves contributed to their problems by fragmenting
into segregated groups lacking direction rather than
uniting behind a common goal.

I also found Dakotans

looked only after their own local or regional interests,
instead of those of the entire territory, and that
further delay was caused by a total lack of
organization.

Each of these problems was apparent

throughout the entire territorial period.

Delay was

certainly a major problem in Dakota, and this point will
be emphasized in subsequent chapters.
Research will follow two directions.

Conventional

methods will be used to examine contemporary and modern
histories, pertinent documentary collections, congres
sional records, and territorial papers.

Quantitative

analysis, involving a study of roll-call materials,
presents the other technique.

I have chosen to broaden

my research to include the use of the computer, a
reliable computer program, and the investigative theory
made feasible by quantitative methodology.
Quantitative history goes beyond the traditional
monograph or committee report.

It also supplements the

boxes of letters, personal papers, and written speeches
left to us by our forefathers.

These common research

tools are often adequate when studying prominent,
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outspoken individuals who possessed a desire to record
their every thought, word, or deed.

However, there were

many minor politicians, who did not leave a prolific
portfolio and spoke only occassionally, if at all, for
the public record.

2

Nevertheless, these individuals

collectively had an impact on American history.

Often

their single surviving record is their roll-call record
in the Congressional Globe or the Congressional
Record.

This vital record will reveal, with careful

analysis, the legislator's behavior on the issues that
passed through the Congress.
Quantitative analysis lends itself very nicely to my
particular subject and clearly gives strong support for
my hypothesis, that the Democratic Party blocked the
statehood quest of Dakota Territory and that Republicans
supported the territory the entire time.

Rice-Beyle

cluster-bloc analysis compares the voting records of one
member of a given legislative body with each of the other
members, in a set of pairwise comparisons that estab
lishes the degree of similarity of their patterns.

The

pairwise comparisons are scored by percentage of
agreement and are plotted on a matrix.

Those who voted

together at a specified level of agreement, here at least
seventy percent, are isolated into blocs.

Fringe members

of a particular bloc may also be determined and included,
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here those who voted with a least fifty percent of the
bloc members, at least seventy percent of the time.
Investigation of the Fiftieth Congress, 1888-1889,
is necessary because it was this Congress that ultimately
allowed Dakota Territory to organize into two states.
used two sets of roll calls.

I

First, because the

Democratic majority in the House of Representatives
failed repeatedly to secure statehood for Dakota, whereas
the Republican majority in the Senate passed its version
of the bill, it is clear Democrats in the House were
holding up the action.

Therefore, I chose twelve

pertinent roll calls that dealt specifically with Dakota
Territory to investigate those individuals who either
supported or opposed the plan.

Second, I ran my program

on the entire United States Congress of 1888-1889,
including both the House and the Senate.

This aided the

second purpose of this thesis, which is to examine the
extent to which partisanship played a role in politics in
the second half of the nineteenth century.

Rice-Beyle

cluster-bloc analysis gave me explicit results which
helped to substantiate my original hypothesis.

The

quantitative analysis added a new dimension to my
research and it likewise exposed me to an unfamiliar
approach to historical research.^
The historiography of this particular period of
Dakota Territorial History is far from complete.

I have
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used contemporary histories, most importantly, George W.
Kingsbury, History of Dakota Territory, 2 vols.
(Chicago:

S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1915),

hereinafter referred to as

History; Compendium of

History and Biography of North Dakota Containing a
History of North Dakota . . . (Chicago:

George A. Ogle

and Company, 1900), hereinafter referred to as
Compendium; Clement A. Lounsberry, North Dakota History
and People:

Outlines of American History, 3 vols.

(Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1917), herein
after referred to as North Dakota History; Lewis F.
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 3 vols. (Chicago and
New York:

The American Historical Society, Inc., 1931);

and Doane Robinson, History of South Dakota, 3 vols.
(Chicago:

B. F. Bowen & Company, 1904).

Some of these authors had first hand experience in
territorial politics and the statehood issue.

There is

no doubt when we read Col. Clement A. Lounsberry, editor
of the Bismarck Tribune, or George W. Kingsbury, of the
Yankton Press and Dakotan, that their true intention
was to leave a very detailed record of events in the
territory.

However, it is equally apparent that they had

a strong prejudice against outsiders, whether Washington
politicians or transplanted territorial officials.
Furthermore, writers from the southern part of the
territory expressed sentiment sympathic to their
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particular region and the same can be said of northern
Dakota writers.

The distance between the northern

section and the southern section caused an absence of
communication which, in turn, intensified mutual distrust
between the two areas.

These writers clearly reflect the

prevailing views of the respective parts of the
territory.

It is most interesting to follow events in

Dakota and to find frequent and considerable discrep
ancies between the sources.

Later histories, notably few

and far between, do not devote many pages to statehood.
It seems a quick run-down of the facts and dates satis
fied the authors.

However, there are two exceptional

modern studies, Herbert S. Schell, History of South
Dakota, 3rd ed. (Lincoln:

University of Nebraska

Press, 1975); and Elwyn B. Robinson, History of North
Dakota (Lincoln:

University of Nebraska Press, 1966).^

The following chapters will discuss events in the
area of Dakota up to statehood in 1889.

I will delineate

what the sources indicated had occurred and their
interpretation of events.

I will also point out

contradictions in their conclusions, adding the results
of my quantitative research.

This will result in a

concise re-interpretation of the statehood issue in
Dakota Territory.

1
>
William M. Neil, "The American Territorial System
Since the Civi War: A Summary Analysis," Indiana
Magazine of History 60 (September 1964):237-38,
hereinafter referred to as "The American Territorial
System." Neil contends that although this seems to be a
long period of time, especially for the territorial
residents, the average period states had to wait for
admittance into the union between 1787 and 1912 was
approximately twenty years. However, the blatant
political maneuverings apparent in the Dakota issue
overshadow Neil's calculations.
p
Many of the speeches found in legislative records
were re-written to sound better, providing inadequate and
often misleading clues as to how a legislator felt about
a particular issue. When voting time came, the roll-call
best indicated the congressman's true intentions. See
Richard E. Beringer, Historical Analysis; Contemporary
Approaches to Clio's Craft (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1978 ), p"p - 287-88, hereinafter referred to as Historical.
^Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and
Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 6067. See also Beringer, Historical, pp. 193-201, 287-306.
^The most important examination of territories in
general is by Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the
United States:
1861-1890; Studies in Colonial Administra
tion (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press,
for the American Historical Association, 1947), herein
after referred to as Territories. Equally important is
Jack E. Eblen, The First and Second United States
Empires; Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968),
hereinafter referred to as First and Second Empires.
The Dakota Territorial PapeFs (microfilm), Department of
Special Collections, University of North Dakota, Grand
Forks, hereinafter cited as Dakota Territorial Papers,
are useful for events occurring in the territory. The
Congressional Globe and Congressional Record offer the
debates in the United States House and Senate.
There are only three useful articles concerning the
Omnibus Bill that admitted North and South Dakota to the
Union: Carroll Gardner Green, "The Struggle of South
Dakota to Become a State," South Dakota Historical
Collections 12 (1 924 ):503-540, hereinafter referred to as
"The Struggle of South Dakota"; Frederic Logan Paxson,
"Admission of the 'Omnibus States,' 1889-1890," Wisconsin
State Historical Society Proceedings 59 (1911):77-96,
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hereinafter referred to as "Omnibus States'"; and Robert
Edwin Albright, "Politics and Public Opinion in the
Western Statehood Movement of the 1880's," The Pacific
Historical Review 3 (September 1934):296-30^ hereinafter
referred to as "Politics and Public Opinion." The best
comprehensive political text on Dakota Territory is by
Howard Roberts Lamar, Dakota Territory, 1861-1889; A
Study of Frontier Politics (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1956). This book is invaluable to any person
studying the Dakotas. Hereinafter it will be referred to
as Dakota Territory. Harold E. Briggs, Frontiers of
the Northwest, A History of the Upper Missouri Valley
(New York: D.A. Appleton-Century Co., 19^0), hereinafter
referred to as Frontiers of the Northwest, presents an
excellent economic view.

CHAPTER

II

THE TERRITORIAL SYSTEM

In the past 200 years, the United States Government
maintained over one half of the country as territories.
Stretching from the Appalachians westward to the Pacific
Ocean, this entire area was ruled under similar forms of
territorial government at one time or another.^
Generally, western territories were held in
territorial status much longer than eastern terri
tories.2

Between 1858 and 1867, five territories were

added to the Union as new states; however, from 1867 to
1889 only one state (Colorado in 1876) was admitted.3
One can only assume the older states jealously guarded
precious statehood and were reluctant to bring in new
states that would reduce their political strength.

A few

of the more populous states also rejected the idea of
’thinly settled' areas having equal representation in the
Senate.^
The criteria for admitting new states into the Union
went through a change from 1861 to 1889.

Prior to the

Civil War, territories were apparently admitted to the
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Union in pairs in order to maintain the balance between
free states and slave states.

After the Civil War, the

states were admitted or not admitted based on the desire
of the parties in power in the House and the Senate to
maintain their numerical advantage in Congress.

Unless a

political party controlled both the House and Senate, a
territory ran the risk that statehood would be approved
in one house yet ignored in the other.

Consequently, a

state either had to wait until its party gained an
advantage in both houses of Congress or until another
territory of the opposite political persuasion would be
available for admittance at the same time.

The latter

action would thereby maintain the existing party balance
in the Senate, therefore the status quo would be
perpetuated.
Dakota Territory, along with the other western
territories, was subject to the colonial status
authorized by the Ordinance of 1787, often called the
Northwest Ordinance, the principles of which were
frequently extended beyond the original Northwest
Territory. ^

Using an old pre-revolutionary British

model utilizing a fully centralized, non-democratic,
colonial government, the Ordinance was further
established by the Wisconsin Territorial Act of 1836.^
This preliminary stage of government was to be temporary,
lasting only until the people were allowed and were able
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to take over for themselves.

It was to provide a

learning experience for the inhabitants, gradually
guiding the territory through several stages of colonial
dependency.^
The organized territory was placed in the care of
the President, who would appoint all government
officials.

The Secretary of State (Secretary of Interior

after 1873) approved and oversaw the appointees, and the
Congress allocated funds needed to pay the expenses of
the territorial legislative sessions.

O

This

arrangement, on the surface, appeared to meet all the
requirements necessary to govern the territories
properly; however, an unsystematic policy prevailed.

The

President, authorized to appoint the officials, was often
too busy with the affairs of national government to
investigate personally the qualifications of his nominees
for the territorial positions.

Therefore, he had to rely

on individual congressmen, who exercised their influence
by suggesting their choices for the assignments.

An

additional area of neglect was the day-to-day supervision
of the correspondence and administrative details
pertaining to the territories.

Reports were handled and

processed by mere clerks in the Department of State,
never receiving the full attention of the proper
administrators.
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Congressional involvement did not usually go beyond
confirmation of officials and appropriation of funds for
the territory.

Congressmen too found little time to

oversee operations effectively; occasionally inaccurate
and uninformed, they dictated to the territorial assembly
which laws could and should be acted upon.

The

congressional committees on the territories were often
the territories’ only contact with the legislative
process.

As indicated by the name, the committees

received reports from the territory and were responsible
for passing on information to the House and Senate.
However, these bodies frequently neglected their duties;
often the territorial reports were all but ignored.
It was unfortunate there was no comprehensive terri
torial policy. Equally regrettable was the apparent lack
of interest by those individuals, namely the weak
Presidents, secretaries of the Interior, and congressmen,
who were supposed to protect the interests of the
powerless, disenfranchised citizens.^
Under the terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
three political stages were to be followed to insure
proper internal development.

The first, an extremely

autocratic stage, called for the appointment, by the
President, of a governor, three judges, and a secretary.
Answerable to Congress and ultimately the President,
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the governor became a very powerful figure. 1 o
Intermediary between Washington and the territory, he
controlled local politics.

He also held veto power over

the local legislature, headed Indian affairs, and
commanded the local militia.

The territorial chief

executive appointed aides and civil officials, collected
taxes, divided counties, called elections, organized
townships, erected buildings, picked out the location of
the capital, defined judicial districts, and was the
principal administrator of all finance.11
Under the supervision of the Department of Justice,
three judges were assigned to insure justice in the
unsettled land.

In addition, a secretary and minor aides

were sent to set up the bureaucracy.1

On the whole,

the judges and the secretary were pale members of the
management team in comparison to the governor.
As soon as the territory attained a total population
of 5,000 people, stage two could be set in motion.

Here

the territorial residents could participate in government
by electing a bicameral assembly.

Settlers could now

extend their influence beyond the local level.

However,

delegates’ deliberations in the territorial assembly
still were subject to the approval of the governor and
1O

Congress. J

18

The second stage of development also established the
office of the territorial delegate, who became the most
prominent official.

Living in Washington, the terri

torial delegate represented the territory in the United
States House of Representatives as a non-voting member.
He could debate in the House and attempt to influence
legislation by personally approaching key members of
Congress, who, in turn, would presumably vote favorably
on vital territorial issues.

Territorial constituents

regarded him as head of his party because they felt he
was in a position to influence federal patronage for
Dakota;

he was, for all practical purposes, accepted as

their protector in Congress."*1* Given the fact that
national politics frequently interfered with his ability
to affect this patronage, and the fact that Dakota and
other territories were a long way from Washington, the
"delegate was important to his constituency because they
did not know how unimportant he was."1^

People failed

to realize that he was no more than a lobbyist, and that
he had no legal authority either inside or outside the
territory, although a strong personality with friends in
the White House or the party that controlled Congress
could doubtless influence events for the benefit of his
constituents if he wished.
Stage three in the territorial plan allowed
residents to write a constitution, organize a state
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government, and ask Congress for admission to the Union.
Sufficient population of at least 60,000 persons,
developed resources for its support, and the abovementioned constitution were necessary criteria for this
final stage.

Statehood was possible whenever Congress

gave its approval.1^
The writers of the Northwest Ordinance believed that
only through the guidance of experienced officials would
American ideas of loyalty, Union and self-government be
insured.

They did not want any "new” countries springing

up in the western part of the United States.

Besides,

individuals in the wilds supposedly lacked any training
in government and state planning, or setting up an
effective judicial system or taxation program.^
Suprisingly, most territories, including Dakota,
were governed quite well during their formative,
educational years.

Often the lack of direction from

Washington forced individuals in the territory to band
together collectively and formulate their own policy.
This, in turn, gave rise to an independent citizenry that
was reluctant to accept guidance from national political
parties or territorial officials.

This independence

consequently spurred harsh criticism of the transplanted
officials.

Many leaders truly were unfair, dishonest, or

opportunist, only using the territorial stint as a
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stepping stone for more lucrative offices down the
road.

18

Democratic Senator Thomas A. Hendricks of

Indiana is quoted as saying specifically about the
territorial governor:
The Govenor of a Territory, as is known to
Senators, is appointed almost altogether from
political considerations. The office itself is
political in its character, and there can be no
objection to the appointment of a man because
of political considerations, as we now under
stand these matters. He goes to the Territory
expecting that appointment as Governor of the
Territory to be a stepping-stone either to the
House of Representatives or to the Senate. He
administers his office with a view to that. He
is a candidate for Congress from the day he
goes there, is a candidate for Senate from the
day he goes there. ^
Washington politicians, eager to build strong political
machines in the territories, often chose their officials
with an eye for obedience rather than for getting the
most qualified man.

The result was the appointment of

"office seekers and party hacks and not future Presidents
and national heroes." PO

Throughout the territorial

period in Dakota, these identical problems propelled the
citizens to try to enter the Union as a state.

They were

constantly trying to be heard in Washington, and to
overcome their powerless political situation; yet the
political party in control of the House, the Democrats,
was unsupportive of their needs.
In defense of the officials, they often arrived from
the east with little knowledge of the area or the
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particular problems of the inhabitants.

Often they were

all but forgotten by the national government and they
received little or no thanks in the territory.

Federal

salaries were very poor, forcing officials to scratch for
a bare living or to travel east repeatedly to maintain
previously established business interests.

The statement

by Republican Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas about
problems caused by poor salaries in the Territory of
Wyoming applied equally to other territories:
I see that this bill provides that the
chief justice and associate justices shall have
a salary of $1,800 a year. I submit whether
you can expect to have any justice administered
by a man who will serve in this Territory for
$1,800 a year. Certainly a salary of $1,800 is
inadequate for a judge in the Territory. . . .
I submit that if you select a man from the
Territory capable of being chief justice, and
give him only $1,800 a year, you offer him no
inducement. That is no inducement for a man to
go there to fill the position; and if you take
a man there, it is no inducement for him to
devote himself exclusively to that office. I
desire to have proper men to administer
justice, and I should prefer to have them taken
from the Territory, if suitable persons can be
had there; but $1,800 will not command their
services, and ought not to do so. If you are
to have justice administered at all, it should
be administered by competent men, and a decent
salary should be provided for them. 1
Nevertheless, the territorial experience was
basically positive.

Good and bad politicians both helped

mold a wild, unsettled land into a prosperous,
independent commonwealth.

Considering the large area

involved and the small pockets of population, this type
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of administration fared very well given the fact that
these factors would tax the most efficient government.
When statehood became a reality, it was a mere formality
as the machinery had been in place for many years. 22
Further discussion of the unpopular transplanted
officials will follow in the section dealing with the
final push for statehood.
In conclusion, the territorial situation that
existed throughout the nation, including the Territory of
Dakota, was difficult to live under yet also beneficial.
Territorial status was undesirable to those who lived
under its control.

In Dakota, the settlers were

constantly trying to break away from the powerless ward
status applied by Congress.

Unfortunately, they were

unsuccessful for many years due to an unsympathetic
Democratic Party in Washington.
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experience of western expansion was placid and democratic
in the United States compared to other nations. He
attributed the success partly to the flexible territorial
system utilized in the western states.

CHAPTER III

YEARS OF DIVISION AND NEGLECT

In order to understand the events in the final
intensive years leading to statehood for Dakota
Territory, it is necessary to study the history of the
entire area.
The area known today as North and South Dakota has
gone through numerous changes in inhabitants, boundaries,
and even names.

Before white men invaded the wide

prairie, Indian tribes were the sole dwellers in the
area.

Mandan, Arikara, and Hidatsa chose a settled

agricultural-based economy while the more volatile Dakota
or Sioux, Crees, and Assiniboin lived nomadically,
gathering in the wild and hunting. 1
European pretensions to ownership of the land
started when Robert Cavelier Sieur de La Salle claimed it
for France in 1682.

Thereafter it passed to Spain in

1763 then back to France in 1801.

The United States

finally bought the section commonly known as the
Louisiana Purchase for $15 million dollars from Napoleon
in 1803-

p

The northeastern section, which is drained

by the Red River of the North, was taken by Henry Hudson
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for the British in 1610 and they turned it into a very
profitable trapping area.

The United States gained

possession at the 49th parallel in 1818 under the
conditions of a treaty with the British.^
The southern half of the Louisiana Purchase became
the territory of Orleans in 1803, leaving the north
called the District of Louisiana.

The entire area that

eventually became Dakota Territory was included in every
other territory in the northwest from the years 1 8 0 3 to
1861.

The boundaries changed as new territories were

formed or existing territories subdivided preparatory to
statehood.

In 1812, the area west of the Missouri River

lay with the territory of Missouri, later called
Nebraska.

The area east of the Missouri and White Earth

Rivers was included with Michigan Territory in 1834.
Dakota went to Wisconsin Territory in 1836, Iowa
Territory in 1838 and Minnesota Territory in 1849.

In

1858, Minnesota became a new state and the area between
its western boundary and the Missouri River did not
belong to any state or organized territory until Dakota
became a territory in 1861.

At this point Dakota

embraced 350,000 square miles, and included the presentday states of North Dakota, South Dakota, a large part of
Montana, the northern one-half of Wyoming, a small part
of east-central Idaho, and a small part of northern
Nebraska.

Between 1863 and 1882, the Territories of

29

Idaho (1863), Montana (1864 and 1873), Wyoming (1868) and
Nebraska (1882) were established, taking western and
southern sections of Dakota.

In the final boundary

decision, Dakota was left with 149,000 square miles.^
The first contact Indians had with the white people
came with the fur traders.

Trapping proved to be an

excellent source of income, with an almost limitless
supply of animals.

After the Lewis and Clark Expedition

early in the 1800's, more traders filtered into the
area.

Large fur companies set up permanent trading posts

on the major rivers.

Initially, the posts drew backwoods

men and Indians to trade the furs for staple goods and
supplies, but as the fur companies discovered the
potential growth of the area, they soon promoted
settlement for businessmen, farmers, and investors.

The

small trading posts turned out to be the hubs of
political activity during the early territorial years.^
Starting as an obscure, unsettled section of the
United States, Dakota, even before territorial status,
had already experienced numerous changes.

As settlements

pushed into the area, economic, political, and develop
mental problems had to be solved.

It follows that large

investors from outside the territory ultimately gave the
region the impetus needed to attract permanent pioneers.
Residents of neighboring states took a keen interest
in the unidentified area within the Big Sioux, Red, and
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Missouri Rivers.

Capitalists from Minnesota, Iowa,

Missouri, and Illinois eyed the unsettled land with great
anticipation, seeing latent opportunities.

The land

speculators and railroad expansionists developed effec
tive organizations to promote the land in such a manner
that potential agricultural settlers would want to
migrate into the area.

Besides directly inviting farmers

and businessmen, the large companies also realized that
an additional source of profit could be reaped if careful
control was maintained over the expected territorial
government.

The ultimate center of government, i.e. the

territorial capital, must be controlled if federal funds
and influence on the novice government were to be worth
while.

The large territory was settled sporadically.

This led to different areas of influence, fragmentation,
and disunity occurring from the first notion of settle
ment.

This theme of disunity manifested itself

repeatedly throughout the territorial days.
Three distinct settlements competed for the chance
to be the force responsible for influencing Congress to
grant territorial status to the uncharted prairie.
Pembina, the first townsite and also the oldest, was
comprised of Metis (part Indian and part French) and fur
traders.

Its close proximity to Canada and its

importance as a trading center meant Pembina served as a
vital link between Winnipeg and St. Paul.

Always an

31

independent group, the people of Pembina were eager for
territorial status and wanted a share of the potential
profits generated from additional settlers.

A

territorial capital would assure the additional growth.
They believed there was also a chance two territories
might be formed out of the large area and their
settlement was an excellent choice for the capital of the
northern half.^
The second area, Yankton, was dominated by two
individuals, General Daniel M. Frost of St. Louis and
Captain John B. S. Todd of Illinois and Kentucky.

They

were the founders of the Frost-Todd Trading Company and
the Upper Missouri Land Company, both of which engaged in
establishing trading and supply centers, building boom
towns, and acquiring parcels of land.

The desire to make

considerable profits was the basic reason Todd and Frost
firmly supported the coming of the territory.

They

wanted to reap the benefits of a booming economy and
control the political arena.

They prompted their fellow

neighbors to petition congress for territorial status in
1859 and 1860, but their pleas were unsuccessful.^
Settlement number three, gathering around the town
of Sioux Falls, was not to be undone by the Frost-Todd
faction.

Settlers here were fully supported by the state

of Minnesota, which assisted them in attempting to set up
a territorial government.

Delegates were sent to
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Congress along with the proper petitions; however,
Congress politely ignored them.

Placement of the

territorial capital in Sioux Falls would be of great
financial benefit to the area.^

As it turned out,

petitions from the frontier were not taken seriously; the
presidential election of 1860 was in the offing, and the
prospects of rebellion preoccupied Congress.

It was

apparent that all legislation was secondary to the
question of slavery.

The North, of course, mostly

adverse to slavery, was most interested in organizing
new, free territories which would, in turn, fortify the
Union.

The South, on the other hand, was not enthralled

with the idea of additional, pro-northern, loyalist
territories.

Therefore, it presented solid opposition on

the territorial question.^
In 1860 a final appeal for territorial status was
brought before the United States House and Senate.

At

this point, most southern states had withdrawn from
Congress; they had anticipated the split in the Union
which ultimately led to the Civil War.

This same group

had expressed the most objections to establishing
additional territories. 1 0

It is no surprise,

therefore, that the territorial bill easily passed both
houses, receiving Senate approval on February 26 and
House approval on March 1, 1861.

On March 2, 1861,

President Buchanan established the Territory of Dakota
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under the guidelines of the Organic Act set forth by
Congress.11
In 1861, the newly formed Dakota Terriotry was an
enormous area, largely unsettled, and teeming with
hostile Indians who were vigorously defending their
shrinking land.

Initial growth was significantly

hindered by national events.

Not only was the United

States slowly recovering from the depression brought on
by the financial panic of 1857, but also, as the economy
recovered, the nation became engaged in the Civil War;
this was followed by the painful process of recovery,
after which the country was hit again by economic depres
sion . 1 2

Until these national problems could be solved,

Dakota Territory remained a remote area that drew little
attention.

Development was postponed almost a

decade.13
Disunity and disharmony plagued Dakota throughout
the early years.

Even the few brave and willing settlers

who did venture into Dakota Territory encountered
numerous problems during the 1860's.

A good transporta

tion system, essential to any state or territory, was
critical to Dakota Territory because of its sheer size
and inaccessibility.

Not only did individuals have

difficulty reaching the territory, but when they arrived,
the railroads ended and roads became mere paths.

Travel

on steamboats was also limited because the territory
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lacked adequate loading facilities and suffered from
periodic low water. 1 ii
Climatic extremes also played a role in deterring
pioneers.

Settlers in Dakota suffered from extremely

cold temperatures and blizzards during the long winters,
while the hot summers often produced drought and prairie
fires.

Crop failures during the 1860's were commonplace

due to scant rainfall and grasshopper plagues.

Shortages

of food and clothing taxed the people, and a lack of
timber threatened their supply of fuel and building
materials.

These physical hardships were difficult

enough, but an added torment was the constant threat of
hostile Indians.

Settlers often lived in isolated

pockets with only a limited number of soldiers in a few
equally isolated garrisons to suppress any attacks.
Hardy souls who braved the hardships often grew
tired of fighting the elements and left Dakota for more
congenial places to live.

One temporary settler in the

area, Army surgeon Dr. Noah M. Glatfelter, described the
prairie to his wife who remained "safe" back east:
Treeless, and all along here, grassless
prairies, produces to the traveller an aspect
the dreariest, bleakest and most forsaken
imaginable and the mind wonders in vain,
whether truly this region was likewise created
for some useful purpose. Travelling here, it
makes your mouth water to see a tree, does your
heart good to obtain sight of a place of abode,
be it ever so rude, and you are readily
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disposed to hail and make friends with all ,
living things, whether man, beast, or bird. °
Other potential settlers heard the rumors of the "Great
American Desert" and chose other places to make their
homes.

The famous western painter, George Catlin, wrote

that the Dakotas were a part of that region known as the
Great Plains, "which is and ever must be useless to
civilized men to cultivate." 1 ^

Established states,

such as Minnesota and Iowa, competed with Dakota for
European and eastern United States immigrants relocating
in the west.

There was no need to venture into Dakota

when good, fertile, agricultural land was available in
more "civilized" states en route. 1 ft°
To sum up the situation, the Civil War, unfavorable
but accurate propaganda, Indian uprisings, crop failures,
blizzards, droughts, and an inadequate transportation
system seriously retarded growth in Dakota Territory
during the 1860’s.

It seemed that the delays occurring

in the territory were endless.

Not only were settlers

unprepared for the climatic and economic problems, they
were powerless to do much about the situation.

Time and

time again, the Dakotans were subject to problems beyond
their control.
As it turns out, Dakotans were forced to wait for
change in events inside and outside the territory.
gloomy facts were finally turned around by the late

The
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860 ’s with the advent of a great population and economic

boom.

Five factors changed the discouraging situation of

the earlier period:

1)

an end to the Civil War, 2)

peaceful contact with the Indians, 3)
success, 4)

agricultural

improved transportation lines, and 5)

the

discovery of gold in the Black Hills of southern Dakota.
Dakota desperately needed money, goods, and
confidence to build a strong economic base.

The end of

the Civil War triggered rapid economic growth in the
northern half of the United Sta tes that generated invest
ment capi tal for speculation in r ai lroads and manufacturing pi ants in the north, and land companies and more
railroads in the terr itor ies •
Rail road s anid capital pour ing into the territory
would be of 1 ittl e use if pe ace ful relations between the
settlers and the Indians had no t be en established.

At

first, bl oodl ess association wi th the Indians seemed
elusive, for pion eers pushed far the r west despite the
fact the Indi ans had clear title to the land.

Gradually

small trading posts grew into major centers of popula
tion, usually on the fringe or within the boundaries of
the Indian lands.

It is no surprise that hostile

confrontations between eager settlers and indignant
natives were frequent and bloody, as the settlers moved
onto Indian land and then called upon the United States
military to protect their homesteads from the angry
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Indians.

The Indians, in turn, were pushed westward and

rightly fought to retain their lands; however, they were
no match for gold miners and land-hungry homesteaders.
The subsequent wars and numerous treaties limited the
Indians' mobility and weakened their resistence.

In the

end, the independent natives were appointed wards of the
United States Government and were forced to live on
restrictive reservations with promises that the govern
ment would help them start farming.

Now the settlers

could feel safe on "their land" on the prairie.

As

territorial resident Moses Armstrong precisely stated,
"here begins the date of permanent settlement in Dakota,
when the retreating Red face look back upon the advancing
sentinels of civilization who had come to subdue the
wilds and adorn the rivers with thriving villages."
Peaceful relations were imposed, rather than earned, but
they were achieved nonetheless. ?
Successful agricultural development likewise spurred
population growth.

Obviously, the majority of the people

finding their way to Dakota wanted land for agricultural
purposes.

After the discouragement of eight years of

poor crops and drought, increased moisture and subsidence
of grasshopper plagues encouraged many farmers to migrate
to Dakota who had previously rejected the notion. 2 0
Boastful settlers sent letters back east and abroad
telling relatives and friends of the wonderful
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opportunities in Dakota.

Relatively little enticement

was necessary, however, for eastern lands were becoming
increasingly expensive, in short supply, and subject to
high taxes.

Dakota, on the other hand, offered flat,

treeless land with relatively low taxes at a favorable
rate of interest.

Under the Pre-emption Act of 1841,

land was cheap, and became free under liberal provisions
of the Homestead Act of 1862, or available at low prices
from the railroads. P 1

Additional acres could be

claimed under the Timber Culture Act of 1873.

Eager

settlers took advantage of these various means of
acquiring land and the number of acres settled increased
dramatically.^3

Farmers practiced diversification of

both livestock and cereal grains.

New strains of

resiliant grains were tested as were inovative milling
practices.

This led to the development of hard spring

wheat, Dakota’s greatest agricultural product. ?4
Improved transportaion also played a vital role in
the development of Dakota Territory.

The paths followed

by settlers were first trod by Indians, and were
gradually widened to accommodate wagons and stage and
freight lines.^

Utilizing the major river systems,

the Missouri and Red, steamboats provided an alternate
mode of transporat ion.

Often a combination system of Red

River carts, stage coaches, and steamboats were
employed.
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The decisive factor in the transport problem rested
with the railroads.
commodity, people.

They brought Dakota its greatest
Thousands of migrants from the

eastern United States and Europe traveled across the
prairie, and all were eager for land.

Cars loaded with

families and belongings dropped pioneers in the territory
and took surplus agricultural products back to needy
eastern markets . ^

A strip of settlement lined the

tracks of railroads.

Towns logically grew in locations

where transportation was established, elevators were
built to store grain before it was shipped east, and new
businesses peddled articles of necessity that came in
with regularity.
The railroads linked Indian agencies, military
posts, mining camps, and railroad construction camps with
major population areas that, in turn, provided profitable
markets for the territorial farmers.

The increase in

rail miles directly affected the economic situation in
Dakota. P f°t

The rails closed the gap between the

frontier and the east.

The St. Paul and Pacific

stretched from St. Cloud, Minnesota, to Breckenridge,
Minnesota, in 1871; Dakota's first railroad, the Northern
Pacific, reached Fargo in 1871 and Bismarck in 1873.
James J. Hill built his Great Northern Railway across the
northern half of Dakota, starting from Grand Forks in
1880.

There was direct competition between this railroad
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and the Northern Pacific.

A branch of the Chicago and

Northwestern, the Sioux City and Pacific Railroad, joined
the Dakota Southern in 1873, linking the east with
Yankton.^
The railroads were the territory's greatest propa
ganda machines.

They placed numerous advertisements in

eastern newspapers and magazines promoting the virtues of
beautiful Dakota.

Europeans also received representa

tives and ample literature to entice them to choose
Dakota as their new home.3°

The railroads furnished

the pioneers a link with the east, supplied stability in
wilderness, and maintained continuity under often
difficult living conditions.
Transportation and settlement were both stimulated
by the discovery of gold in 1874 on the banks of French
Creek near the town of Custer in the Black Hills.
Thousands of people migrated to the gold fields,
including not only miners, but speculators and business
men as well.

New railroads were used to transport gold

and other products out of the Hills and take staple goods
back in.

Gold not only brought wealth to the Territory

but attracted many settlers who never made it to the gold
mines.

Many stopped along the way to take up farming or

other business interests; others came to mine the miners,
including some farmers, who realized that the Black Hills
would serve as a new market for them to sell their
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crops.

Lawyers and merchants also found a ready market

for their services and goods.
Despite these elements promoting growth, however,
government did not develop as quickly as it should have.
During the early years of slow growth, and in the later
period as well, national politics directly affected the
economic and political situation in the territory, but
without much reference to the actual needs of the local
inhabitants.

The party in power in Washington, or more

clearly, the President and Congress, were responsible for
the political appointments and oversaw territorial opera
tions.-^

Thus, territorial politics were shaped by the

needs of eastern politicians.

The party sent these loyal

servants and naturally expected the territory would be
administered properly, according to party policy.^3
President Abraham Lincoln appointed his trusted
friend, William Jayne of Illinois, as the first governor
of Dakota Territory in 1861.

Jayne approached the

territory with his retinue of henchmen, all setting up
residence in Y a n k t o n . T h e

first problem for the new

governor was the selection of the capital city.

Three

rival towns - Yankton, Vermillion, and Bon Homme competed for the seat of government.

Such heated debates

took place in the assembly that the Dakota Cavalry was
called into Yankton to insure peace.

Yankton

triumphantly won the seat of the territorial capital in
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1862 and, as a trade off, Vermillion was promised the

university of the Territory, and Bon Homme, the
penitentiary .^5
Jayne’s other tasks included organization of govern
ment, the framework taken from the Organic Act and
lasting the the next eighteen years.

He took the census

enacted civil and criminal codes, established a revenue,
organized the local militia, defined the limits of the
assembly, drew county boundaries, established judicial
districts and set up school sections in the townships.
Bureaucratic employees included specifically the
secretary, chief justice, associate justices, federal
district attorney, U.S. Marshal, commissioner of rail
roads, and surveyor general.

Postmasters and Indian

agents were also engaged.^
Although the governor exercised tremendous
authority, local residents did have a small voice in
territorial politics.

Control of county and township

affairs was maintained by the elections held on the
precinct, county, district, and township levels for the
registers of deeds, county commissioners, sheriffs,
judges of probate, county attorney, surveyors, coroners,
superintendents of schools, justices of the peace, and
constables.

More importantly, the representatives sent

to the territorial assembly and the congressional
delegate who served in Washington were elected by Dakota
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settlers who, in turn, expected their demands be
remembered and, if possible, fulfilled. ^
The first elections in the territory brought forth a
group of men who were, more than likely, unfamiliar with
politics.

The first territorial assemblies proved to be

unruly, and included many inexperienced young men with
little or no knowledge of proper legislative
proceedings.

These unseasoned assemblages spent consider

able time deliberating minor topics that delayed
discussion of more pertinent t o p i c s . O n occassion,
some prominent issues, such as the removal of the capital
and territorial division, were discussed with heated
emotions.

The assembly proposed tax revenues, locations

of territorial institutions, development of the economy,
and inducements for potential settlers.

Deliberations

also included discussions of Indian policy, women's
suffrage, creation and organization of counties and
county seats, prohibition, land fraud, and railroad
issues, such as taxation and land ownership.^9
However, the assembly lacked autonomy, as its actions
were always subject to the governor's consent.

He could

and did occasionally overrule or intervene at his
discretion, regardless of the issue.

His veto power

stifled the assembly and further aggravated the dislike
of "foreign" rule.2^

The early political parties, plagued by factional
feuds and obscure ideologies, were often led by
charismatic individuals who appealed to the common man.
They tended to make big promises.

Strict party adherance

was yet to come; bribery and vote buying were all too
frequent an occurrence.

The settlers nonetheless were

extremely active participants in the entire political
arena, becoming zealously involved in local politics.
National elections were followed with dedication as
Dakotans, although unable to vote, were fully aware that
the national scene directly affected events back home in
the territory.^
Dakota Territory survived the lean years of the
1 8 6 0 's,

endured the undefined economic and political

experimentation of the 1 8 7 0 's, and anticipated the long
struggle for statehood in the 1880's.

The settlements,

few and far between, worked against unity in the
territory.

Sectional rivalry, coupled with an

unsympathetic Congress in Washington, meant years of
frustration.

Statehood was foremost in the mind of the

people in the territory for over eighteen years.
following chapters discuss the major problems and
individuals involved in the statehood movement.

The
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^Herbert S. Schell, History of South Dakota, 3rd
ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), pp.
15-23; Elwyn B. Robinson, History of North Dakota,
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, l"9 6 6 ), pp. IT26.
“^Treaty Series, Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and
Other International Acts of the United State of Amer
ica, vol. T, (1931 ), No"I gTTJ ’’Treaty for' the Cession of
Louisiana,” 30 April 1803, pp. 498-511.
In the same
volume, see also "Convention for the Payment of Sixty
Million Francs ($11,250,000) by the United States," No.
86a, 30 April 1803, pp. 512-15. A third treaty
concerning France can be found in the same volume listed
as "Convention for the Payment of Sums Due by France to
Citizens of the United States," No. 86b, 30 April 1803,
pp . 51 6-28.
^Ibid., "Convention signed at London," No. 112, 20
October 1818, pp. 658-62. Additional sources included
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Educational
Division Meredith Corporation, 1970), pp. 159-60; History
of the Red River Valley, Past and Present, 2 vols.
(Chicago: C^ F~. Cooper and Company, 190 9), 1:453, herein
after referred to as History of the Red River Valley;
Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, p. 13.
^Dakota, An Act to Provide Temporary Government
for the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of
Surveyor-General Therein, Laws of Dakota, (1862):2 1;
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the
Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of Surveyor
General Therein, Statutes at Large 12, 239-^ (i8 6 1);
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the
Territory of Montana, Statutes at Large 13, 85 - 92
( 1 8 6 4 ) ; An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the
Territory of Wyoming, Statutes at Large 15, 78- 83
( 1 8 6 8 ) ; Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, p. 31.
Idaho
became a territory Tn 1 8 6 3 , taking part of the present
day states of Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. Montana
Territory gained another portion from the western part of
Dakota Territory in 1873; and Nebraska, in 1882, claimed
a small piece of land in the south. General Laws, and
Memorials and Resolutions of the Territory of Dakota,
Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Assembly
(Yankton, Dakota Territory:
Josiah cT Trask, 1 8 6 2 ) , pp.
iii-vii. See also Crawford, History of North Dakota,
1 : 3 1 9 ; History of the Red River Valley, p. 4 5 3 ;
Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, pp. 28-31.

46

^In 1858 the Ponca and Yankton treaties ceded to
the United States 16,000,000 acres for a mere
$2,000,000. The Indians then moved to reservations near
Ft. Randall. Treaty Between the United Stat es of
America, and the Yan cton Tribe of Sioux, or Dacotah
Indians. Concluded at Washington, April 19, 1858.
Ratified by the Sena te, February 16 , 1859. Proclaimed by
the Presiden t o f the United States , February 26, 1859,
Statutes at Larg e 1 1 , 743-9 ( 1 858) . Armstrong, Early
Empire Build er s , pp . 13-28; Schell , History of South
Dakota, pp. 49-64; Robinson, History of North Dakota,
pp . ST-75; Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 146—
156. The white men also produced the metis or halfbreed, a group of very tough characters. Most of their
fathers were French, Canadian, Scottish, or English and
their mothers were Chippeawa, Cree, or Assiniboin.
^Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 50-54. According
to Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:40-52, Pembina
was first settled In 1819. Briggs, Frontiers of the
Northwest, p. 363, states the Hudson Bay Company made
arrangements with the U. S. Government to use a route
from the Great Lakes through Minnesota and Pembina upward
to Canada. This greatly enhanced Pembina's position as a
trade center and a potential territorial capital.
\amar, DakotaTerritory, pp. 36-41; Kingsbury,
History , 1:53^-33; Schell, History of South Dakota,
pp. 69-77; Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:208-33,
260; Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 350-61.
Weston A. Goodspeed, The Province and the States, A
History of the Province of Lousiana Under France and
Spain, and of the Territories and States of the United
States formed Therefrom, 7 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin:
The Western Historical Association, 1904), 6:206-10,
hereinafter cited as The Province & The States.
Captain John Blair Smith Todd was a graduate of West
Point, and was originally from Kentucky. Resigning from
the Army in 1856, he formed the trading company with
General Frost. A cousin of Mary Tood Lincoln, Todd was
one of the founding fathers of Yankton. General Daniel
Marsh Frost was also a West Point graduate. Originally
from New York, he excelled in business at St. Louis,
Missouri, before entering the partnership with Todd.
Both men were instrumental in aiding Dakota in becoming a
territory. Surrounding states that backed the efforts of
Todd and Frost were Iowa, Missouri, and Illinois.
®The Dakota Land Company exercised the most
influence in the town, dealing in land speculation.
Lamar, Dakota Territory, p. 41-50; "The Settlement at
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Sioux Falls," Collections of the State Historical Society
of South Dakota 6 (1912):133-80. Samuel J. Albright,
"The First Organized Goverment of Dakota," Collections of
the Minnesota Historical Society 8 (1898):129-47.
^Armstrong, Early Empire Bulders, p. 30;
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:259-62; Kingsbury,
History, 1: 16 6 - 6 9; History of the- Red River Valley,
p p . 45-57; Moses K. Armstrong, Centennial Address on
Dakota Territory Giving Its Growth, Population, and
Resources; Delivered at the U. S. Centennial Exhibition
in Philadelphia on September 28, 1S76 (Philadelphia:
J.
FI Lippincott and Co., 1876), pp. 5-7, hereinafter
referred to as Centennial Exhibition.
1^Compendium of History and Biography of North
Dakota: Containing a History of North Dakota: Embracing
an Account of Early Explorations, Early Settlement,
Indian Occupancy, Indian History and Traditions,
Territorial and State Organization; a Review of the
Political History; and a Concise History of the Growth
and Development of the State: Also a Compendium of
Biography of North Dakota: Containing Biographical
Sketches of Hundreds of Prominent Old Settlers and
Representative Citizens of the State, With a Review of
Their Life Work; Their Identity With the Growth and
Development of the State; Reminiscences of Personal
History and Pioneer Life and Other Interesting and
Valuable Matter Which Should be Preserved in History
(Chicago: George A. Ogle and Company, 1900), pp. F*T-8 6 ;
hereinafter referred to as Compendium; Armstrong, Early
Empire Builders, pp. 166-69; Loundsberry, North Dakota
History, 1:259-62.1
1 1 U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe,
36th Cong., 2nd sess., 1861, 1:6977 923, 1207-1208, 1337;
Cong. Globe, 2:1356, 1362. The President had approved
and signed, "An act (S. No. 562) to provide a temporary
government for the Territory of Dakota, and to create the
officer of Surveyor General therein." Laws of Dakota,
pp. 21-28; and An Act to Provide a Temporary Government
for the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of
Surveyor General Therein, 239-

Commencing at a point in the main channel
of the Red River of the North, where the fortyninth degree of north latitude crosses the
same; thence up the main channel of the same,
and along the boundary of the State of
Minnesota, to Big Stone lake; thence along the
boundary line of the said State of Minnesota to
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the Iowa line; thence along the boundary line
of the State of Iowa to the point of intersec
tion between the Big Sioux and Missouri rivers;
thence up the Missouri river and along the
boundary line of the Territory of Nebraska, to
the mouth of the Niobrara or Running Water
river; thence following up the same, in the
middle of the main channel thereof, to the
mouth of the Keha Paha or Turtle Hill river;
thence up said river to the forty-third
parallel of north latitude; thence due west to
the present boundary of the Territory of
Washington; thence along the boundary line of
Washington Territory, to the forty-ninth degree
of north latitude; thence east along said fortyninth degree of north latitude, to the place of
beginning, be, and the same is hereby,
organized into a temporary government, by the
name of the Territory of Dakota.
According to Armstrong, Centennial Address, p. 8 , "The
territory did not hear the news [of the new territorial
status] - [it was so] far removed from rails and
telegraphs. News did not reach Yankton until 11 days
after passage of the law."
1P

Especially hard hit were the land companies and
railroads, both essential to the development of Dakota
Territory. Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:259.
^ History of the Red River Valley, pp. 79-80.
1 ^Paxson,

"Omnibus States," pp. 77-78.

^Briggs, Frontier of the Northwest, pp. 366-70,
534-39- After the Sioux Uprising of 1862, it was
reported that from one-half to three-fourths of the
farmers in Dakota had left the territory.
^Dr. Noah M. Glatfelter to Mary, July 30, 1865,
Dr. Noah M. Glatfelter, "Letters from Dakota Territory,
1865," Missouri Historical Society, Saint Louis Bulletin
1 8 ( 1 9 6 2 ): 1 18.
^References to Catlin can be found in Kingsbury,
History, 1:338; and Briggs, Frontiers of the North
west, pp. 368-69. Briggs also contains a small
quotation from Lieutenant G. K. Warren, who wrote about
Dakota in his journal, Exploration in the Dakota Country
in the Year 1855. Warren asserted flatly that "the
land west of the ninety-seventh meridian was not fit for
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agricultrual settlement.” With this sort of propaganda,
it is no surprise Dakota's population grew very slowly.
See also Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New
York: Ginn and Co., 1931), pp. 152-60.
1 ft

Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 36669; Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:253-55;
Kingsbury, History"! 1: 338; Armstrong, Early Empire
Builders, p. 54; Paxson, "Omnibus States," pp. 77-78.
^The first parcel of land the government acquired
to open to white settlers in Dakota was negotiated under
the treaty of Traverse-de-Sioux, Minnesota. A small
strip of land, it included the river valley of the Big
Sioux River, covering the present towns of Sioux Falls,
Flandreau and McClary, according to Armstrong, Centennial
Exhibition, pp. 5-7. For important treaties, see the
Yankton Treaty of 1858 and the Ft. Laramie Treaty of
1868. Both can be found in Charles J. Kappler, Indian
Affairs Laws and Treaties, 2 vols. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1903), 2:776-81, 998-1007;
Armstrong, Centennial Exhibition, pp. 6-7.
POEuropean immigrants came from Scandinavia,
Bohemia, Russia, Scotland, Canada, England, Ireland, and
Germany, and new world immigrants came from Canada and
eastern states. They were reputed to be hard-working
individuals who eagerly tilled the land. Briggs,
Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 367-69, 387-88, 411-15,
454-73, 488-96, 539-44; Robinson, History of North
Dakota, pp. 145-48.
^^An Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers
on the Public Domain, Statutes at Large 12, 392-94
(1862); Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 372,
411-15; "A History of Grasshoppers in Clay County," St.
Paul Press, 18 July 1874. Lamar, History of North
Dakota, pp. 137-40, 148-51; see also "Grants of Land By
Congress, and Charter of the St. Paul and Pacific and of
the First Division of the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad
Companies," General Railroad Laws of Minnesota and the
Territory of Dakota (St. Paul, Office of the Pioneer
Press Co., 1879), PP• 183-208.
2 2 Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 384;
The Timber Culture Act became law March 3, 1873, to
encourage the growth of timber on western prairies.
Provided a person would plant, protect, and keep healthy
40 acres of timber for 10 years, he received title to the
quartersection of which the 40 acres were a part. It
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provided for a maximum of 160 acres. An Act to Encourage
the Growth of Timber on Western Prairies, Statutes at
Large 17, 605-606 (1873)- An Act to Encourage the Growth
of Timber on the Western Prairies, Statutes at Large
2 0 , 113-15 (1878).
2^From 1862 to 1866, 100,000 acres were settled
upon; 1866 to 1 8 7 0 , 500,000 acres; 1883, 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; 1889,
42,000,000 or one-half of Dakota was filed upon (cumula
tive total). P. F. McClure, Resources of Dakota. An
Official Publication Compiled by the Commissioner of
Immigration, Under Authority Granted by the Territorial
Legislature (Sioux Falls, Dakota: n .p ., 1887), p . 245;
Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 424.
?4
Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 48596, 509-522.
^Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 37681; Kingsbury, Dakota 2:1188-90; Robinson, History of
North Dakota, pp. 99-118, 129-32; Schell, History of
South Dakota, pp. 80-84.
^Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 376;
Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 65-79.
2

^Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 411—

!5.
2 ^Ibid., pp. 192-95, 387-88, 411-15; Armstrong,
Early Empire Builders, pp. 37-41; Paxson, "Omnibus
States," pp. 78-79j Robinson, History of North Dakota,
pp. 34-40; Ralph V. Hunkins and John Clark Lindsey, South
Dakota Its Past, Present, and Future (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1932), pi El~, hereinafter referred to
as South Dakota.
2 %riggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 371—
72, 376-83, 416-29; Crawford, History of North Dakota,
pp. 2 5 6 - 7 2 contains a map showing construction of the
railroads in North Dakota on p. 256; Kingsbury, History,
1:534; Paxson, "Omnibus States," pp. 78-79; Robinson,
History of North Dakota, pp. 122-32; Loundsberry, North
Dakota History"! 1: 327-4 6 .

3°Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 41027; Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 144-45;
Dakota had its own immigration organization, the Bureau
of Immigration. This body promoted Dakota settlement in
the east and in Europe. Dakota, Territorial Legislature,
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Senate Journal , 1871, p. 233; Dakota, Territorial
Legislature, House Journal, 1871, p. 172.
O1

J Schneider, "Taxation in Dakota Territory," pp.
399-^00; Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 25-41,
387-90. There is a postscript to the gold mine situation
of Dakota Territory. In March 1863, the Territory of
Idaho was established, carving a small portion of land
from western Dakota Territory. In May 1864, the
Territory of Montana was formed, taking more western
land. In those two years, Dakota lost its two richest
mining areas and its most populous sections of the
territory. Armstrong, Centennial Exhibition, p. 11.
3^Lamar, Dakota Territory, p. 14.
33lbid ., p . 69.
3^North Dakota Blue Book (n.p.: Secretary of
State, 1981), pp. 160-67. either officials included John
Hutchinson, Minnesota, Secretary; Philemon Bliss, Ohio,
Chief Justice; S. P. Williston, Pennsylvania and J. S.
Williams, Tennessee, Associate Justices. This source
lists all Territorial Delegates, Governors, Secretaries,
Chief Justices, Associate Justices, United States
Attorneys, United States Marshals, Surveyor Generals,
Attorney-Generals, Auditors, Treasurers, Superintendents
of Public Instruction, and Commissioners of Railroads for
the entire territorial period. In addition, it is an
excellent reference guide for the members of the
Territorial Legislature.
Lincoln was so busy with the government and Civil
War that he did not always appoint officials on the basis
of merit alone (nor did other Presidents). However,
considering the political patronage practices of this
period of American History, it was not within Lincoln's
power to do anything contrary to established practice.
Lamar, Dakota Territory, p. 67.
3-*Kingsbury, History, 1:206-09; Loundsberry,
History of Dakota, 1:277-78 .
^Schell, "Politics— Palaver and Polls," in Dakota
Panorama, p. 188; History of the Red River Valley,
p p . 47-65; Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp~ 68-73. For a
complete list and description of the initial public
servants, see Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, pp. 3234. Also see the 2nd Annual Message of Governor William
Jayne, Delivered to the Legislative Assembly of Dakota
Territory, in Joint convention, on Thursday, December 19,
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1862 (Yankton, Dakota Territory: Kingsbury and Ziebach,
Public Printers, 1862).
In the first decade, Dakota established a code of
laws for the territory. It turned out to be a very
notable set of laws and it was used as a guideline for
the Territory of Wyoming when it was formed in 1868.
Republican Senator Jacob M. Howard, of Michigan stated,
in the Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2nd sess., 3:2799:
The Territory of Dakota has a very
respectable code of laws at present, and I
believe they are very acceptably administered.
Probably nine tenths of the new Territory is
carved out of the Territory of Dakota, and the
people have been accustomed to and well
acquainted with the laws of the Territory of
Dakota, while the remainder of the new
Territory is within the present Territory of
Utah, wich is governed by a distinct and
separate code of laws, many of which are very
peculiar in their nature and very objection
able. I would therefore adapt the territorial
code of Dakota to the governemnt of the new
Territory of Wyoming, so that there shall be
really but one code of laws in the Territory.
■^According to the Organic Act, any free white
male, over the age of 2 1 years, who either declared
allegiance to the U.S. Consitution or was a citizen of
the country could vote, provided he was a resident of the
territory. An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for
the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of
Surveyor General Therein, 239-44; Lamar, DakotaTerritory, ppl ET, 69; Schell, "Politics-Palaver and
Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp. 93, 98, 102, 208;
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, pp. 262-68;
Kingsbury, History 1:230-31, 670; Kingsbury, History
2:1 022 ,

'\56E~.

^Arms t r o n g states that many assemblyman were
educated in eastern colleges, including doctors, lawyers,
and ministers, but frontiersmen were represented too,
with buckskin suits and long hair. Armstrong, Early
Empire Builders, p. 52. As Armstrong relates,

In one of these early legislatures my seat
was near a frontier member and desperado, by
the name of Jim Somers, who some years after
wards was shot dead for jumping a claim near
Chamberlain.
I remember vividly the only
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speech Jim made in the Legislature.
It was
short, but full of fire and threats of vengence
against all who should dare to vote against his
bill legalizing marriages between white men and
squaws.
Jim and his cannon were both loaded
that morning, when he arose with blood in his
eye, and swore he would blow out all the brains
of the assembled lawmakers if they killed his
bill. He declared that what Dakota needed was
less brains and more children, and he struck
his fist on the desk and moved that the
Legislature adjourn and take Indian wives and
go out populating country.
Violence was very common during the early days.
Frontier wars and land fights among settlers and between
settlers and territorial officials were common.
In 1873,
General E. S. McCook, Secretary of the Territory, was
shot and killed in a public railroad meeting in Yankton
by P. P. Wintermute, a banker. Armstrong, Centennial
Exhibition, p. 16.
^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,” in Dakota
Panorama, pp. 186-205; Loundsberry, North Dakota
History, pp. 2M-25, 369-89.
^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,” in Dakota
Panorama, pp. 93-97; Briggs, Frontiers of the
Northwest, p. 82; Kingsbury, History^ 1:509-60; An Act
to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of
Dakota, and to Create the Office of Surveyor General
Therein" 239-^; Loundsbury, North Dakota History-^
1:262—68; Compendium, pp. 89-92.
^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,” in Dakota
Panorama, p p . 103, 186-95; Kingsbury, History, 1:7869 6 ; Pomeroy, Territories, p. 37.

CHAPTER IV

THE STATEHOOD MOVEMENT IN EARNEST

After the turbulent early years, 1861-1870, Dakota
settled down to developing its vast land.

Under the

territorial status established by Congress, Dakota was
able to build a solid economy and stable government
carefully.

Pacification of the Indians assured setters

unhindered access to the land, population boomed with the
arrival of European immigrants, political party organiza
tion evolved, and a decrease in federal expenditures
resulted in a less colonial relationship with
Washington.

Now that the territory was in order,

Dakotans could afford to direct their attention toward
petitioning Congress to admit them to the Union as an
equal state .
It was natural that Dakotans became interested in
bringing the territory into the Union.

Citizens started

to ask for statehood as early as 1871, when a memorial
was initiated and adopted by the Territorial Assembly and
relayed to Congress, asking for territorial division on
an east-west line at the 46th parallel of north latitude
(roughly along the current line dividing North and South
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Dakota).

But no action was taken.

Similar resolutions

were adopted in Dakota territory in 1872, 187^ and 1877;
p
all met with the same dismal disregard.
These
requests were repeated frequently until statehood in
1889.

Congress received petitions, memorials, and

individual pleas from the territory regularly.
It was apparent from the early days of the territory
that a

unique situation developed in Dakota.

The

citizens did not wish to remain a single large territory
and ultimately become a large state.

They decided, at an

early date, that their interests would be better served
if they were two separate entities.

Each time a memorial

was submitted, they made a request for separate terri
tories, permission to write two constitutions, establish
ment of two state governments, and finally, the grant of
statehood for two states with all of its privileges and
rights.^
However, Dakota's actions were futile.

At this

early date in the history of the territory, neither the
Republicans nor the Democrats in Washington were inter
ested in the least in a distant territory.

The slightest

notion that the territory was dissatisfied with being too
large or the fact the residents did not particularly like
associating with other members from distant parts of the
territory caused Congress to dismiss the entire Dakota
issue.

Washington politicians were not interested in
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forming new territories or admitting any new states— much
less two.

There was no considerable discussion in

Congress at this time about bringing in new states and
any deliberations were, more than likely, negative
towards two states.

Upon hearing that Dakota wanted to

divide and become two states, Republican Senator William
M. Stewart of Nevada observed, "there is not sufficient
good land in the whole of Dakota Territory to make more
than one state.

We are making too many small territories

which could never become states.

It would be better to

consolidate rather than divide."^
This preoccupation with dual statehood therefore
caused problems for the young territory, ultimately
prolonging the prospect of joining the Union for many
years.

The reason stemmed from an appearance of disunity

within the territory.

Congress had a perfect opportunity

and right to put aside the wishes of a disorganized
territory, noting that even Dakotans were unclear about
what they really wanted.
Division of the territory was always a vital consid
eration to the Dakotans.

They were not satisfied

remaining a large, clumsy territory with pockets of
settlement.

All elements agreed the territory was too

extensive, and that sheer size would prevent government
from operating properly.^

Distance hindered travel and
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communication between population centers, causing intense
isolation and sectionalism.®
Considering the fact that the first colonists
occupied the conservative, southeastern area, fanning out
from Yankton, it is no surprise that they regarded them
selves as the political center of the territory.
never fostered any affection for the north.

They

They consid

ered that "part of the territory north of the 46th
parallel [to be] a barren and desolate waste and believed
it would never support any considerable population and
would always be a burden to the southern half if they
were tied t o g e t h e r . T h e

southeastern section felt

totally self-contained, practicing diversified farming on
a small scale supplemented by a strong, well-established
business community.

Its trade centers were Chicago,

Sioux City, Milwaukee and, to a lesser degree,
Minneapolis/St. Paul.®
The second major center of population in the
territory, the Black Hills, was located in the south
western corner of southern Dakota.

It was given slight

consideration by the Yankton group, for it was completely
unsettled until the gold rush of 1874.

Official opening

of the area occurred after the Indian and settler claims
were resolved in 1877.

The discovery of gold at

approximately the same time prompted thousands to flood
q
into the region with gold fever.7 Transient miners and
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minimal agriculture gave the Black Hills an uncertain
reputation.

Speculation was the key to this region.

The

Hills tended to be less organized politically than
Yankton, thereby posing no immediate threat to Yankton's
supremacy.

Throughout the territorial period the Black

Hills more or less followed the political lead of the
southeastern section of Dakota.

The question of division

of the territory was between the northern half of the
territory and the southern half; there were no other
fragmented groups in other parts of the territory that
were politically important.
Naturally, as the population expanded throughout the
northern section and a budding economy emerged, southern
Dakota came to view its backward neighbor with apprehen
sion.

It watched the growing power of the great rail

roads and influence of eastern corporations in the
northern half and feared domination by them.10

This

third region, northern Dakota, possessed a predominantly
wheat growing and grazing economy, including the famous
Bonanza farms of the Red River Valley.

Their trade

centers were Minneapolis/St. Paul, Duluth and
Winnipeg.11

The completion of the Northern Pacific

Railroad to Bismarck in 1873 attracted significant
numbers of settlers from Minnesota and Canada to northern
Dakota.

Population spread north and south along the Red

River Valley and east and west on the right of way of the
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Northern Pacific.

Northern Dakotans rather enjoyed the

benefits of the railroad and additional population.

They

soon realized the potential political and commercial
1?
advantages.
Southern Dakotans, on the other hand, were not
delighted with a growing northern economy.

They

vigorously clamored to Washington for separate terri
tories.

They felt their potential strength was

threatened and they were unwilling to share their
political power with the northern section of the
territory, nor were they intending to follow economi
cally.

It is not surprising, therefore, that over the

years, the Dakota Territory established most business,
professional, and religious organizations with dual opera
tions.

In the early 1880's, penal, charitable, and

educational institutions were also organized with future
division in mind.

Institutions were set up in pairs,

including the insane asylums, north 1883, south 1879;
penitentiaries, north 1883, south 1881; universities,
north 1883, south 1883; agricultural colleges, north
1883, south 1881; normal school, north 1883, south 1881.
It seemed each half of the territory was determined to
have as little contact as possible with the other, which
accentuated the problem. J
In summary, there were two unique, segregated
sections in Dakota with different economic, political,
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even social views.

Neither of the section's trusted the

other and whatever

powers or influence already possessed

were jealously guarded.

Fellowship and helpfulness was

not extended from one part of the territory to another,
resulting in years of discord.

Regionalism later proved

to be a serious problem when the push for statehood
needed unity and a common goal.11*
Southern Dakota's anxiety about the north was
increased by the capital removal issue.

The decision to

transfer its location from the southern stronghold,
Yankton, to the northern part of the territory was viewed
with displeasure.

A possible loss of the capital to the

North obviously indicated a decline in political impor
tance both for Yankton as well as the southern half of
Dakota.

Since this area had, up to now, dominated the

political arena, one can readily understand the alarm.
Early in the 1880's, Governor Nehemiah G. Ordway devel
oped the plan to move the capital from Yankton to another
part of the territory.

He reasoned that this action

would strengthen the territory, believing that Dakota
could eventually be admitted into the Union as one
powerful, large state.

In 1883, he secured the removal

of the capital from Yankton to Bismarck, claiming the
population had shifted northward and a centrally located
capital would be more accessable to the entire
territory.

Besides, Yankton was in an inconvenient
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location and, according to Ordway, the amenities of
official and social life were being entirely ignored
since it was so distant from the social hubs in the
larger cities.

Bismarck, on the other hand, hardly

qualified as a center of social activity in 1883.

This

sentiment indicates Ordway seemed willing to attach any
issue to the capital removal situation.
Governor Ordway believed in the bidding system.
This called for interested towns and cities to submit a
bid if they were serious about becoming the new terri
torial capital. In his Governor’s report of 1883 he
stated that it was the "propriety and duty of the
governor and legislative assembly to secure proper
capitol buildings without cost to the Territory." J
The bids were to be submitted to the Executive Committee
Alexander McKenzie, Alexander Hughes, John P. Belding,
George A. Mathews, Burleigh F. Spalding, Milo W. Scott,
Charles H. Myers, Henry H. DeLong, and M.D.

Thompson.

The bids were to include the following:

amount of

money, description of the land, twenty percent of the
cash donated, a bond for the amount of the proposal, an
abstract, and free title to the land.

The Commission

stated that the following bids were received:

Aberdeen,

$100,000 and 160 acres of land; Pierre, $100,000 and 250
acres; Bismarck, $100,000 and 320 acres; Mitchell,
$160,000 and 160 acres; Redfield, $100,000 and 240 acres
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Ordway, $100,000 and 320 acres; Canton, $100,000 and 160
acres; Frankfort, $100,000 and 160 acres; Huron, $100,000
and 160 acres; Odessa, $200,000 and 160 acres; and
Steele, $100,000 and 160 acres.

It soon became obvious

that Bismarck was the favorite choice for the capital.
Although other cities matched or exceeded Bismarck’s bid,
the officials who were in a position to vote on the
issue, clearly wanted Bismarck regardless of the other
bids.

It was necessary the Committee meet in Yankton,

the current capital, however, so Ordway conveniently
arranged the party to be aboard a train that whisked it
through the city, thereby fulfilling the requirements but
omitting the unpleasant necessity of hearing serious
objections.

Eventually all the sites were visited by the

Commission and final selection was voted on in Fargo,
June 1, 1883*

Bismarck was chosen on the 5th ballot.^

In the final analysis, the single-state advocates
were victorious when it came to the capital removal
bill.

Ordway, confident from the support given by the

Northern Pacific Railroad, powerful political boss
Alexander McKenzie, and many newspapers, singlehandedly
postponed the dual territory-statehood proposition.
Ordway, along with his backers, represented the strongest
political bloc in the territory.

Whereas the majority of

northern Dakotans heretofore supported dual statehood,
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they were now thrilled with their new importance and
ft
many, in turn, supported Ordway's one-state plan. 1 °

There were other strong supporters of the single
state plan.

Among them were railroads and eastern

investors who preferred the territorial system with its
indulgent officials and legislature.

Friends and

lobbyists in Washington could also exercise effective
influence that would be felt in the territory both in
legislation and appointments.

By supporting Ordway, they

believed statehood would be delayed because the inhab
itants of the territory would disagree, thereby splitting
any organized effort to achieve statehood and neces
sitating a continuance of the territorial

s y s t e m .1 9

Local Democrats also defected from the
divisionists.

President Grover Cleveland, elected in

1884, was the first Democrat to be elected President
since Dakota Territory was organized.

New Democratic

appointees soon found it difficult to support earlier
ideas of division and statehood, for these moves would
curtail their command of local affairs.

In addition,

the Democratic pary, in Washington, naturally believed
that one state was better than two, considering the
Republican affiliations of the inhabitants.

It believed

it could influence the Republican territorial residents
if the Democratic officials were to retain local control
for a few years. 21
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The removal of the capital and Ordway's single state
plan both further alienated southern Dakota from the
north and led to an intense campaign for immediate
division and statehood for the southern half.

Op

The

south believed it was unjustly treated by the Ordway
government and felt a territorial government was totally
inadequate. In the end, it almost became an anti-Ordway
campaign with more vigor than the dual statehood quest.
Leaders in the southern section felt he exemplified the
typical inadequate, corrupt territorial official.
for Ordway brought strength to the south.

Hatred

Both parts of

the territory at least agreed that transplanted officials
did not understand the needs of the people, much less
regional politics.

Many officials capitalized on lenient

laws and increased their own fortunes with little regard
for the people they were serving.

Political feuds

revolved around select charismatic men who manipulated
the government to serve their needs . ^

It is no

surprise that appointees, often referred to as "carpet
baggers," were targets of much criticism.

One terri

torial delegate, William Stewart of Nevada, spoke for
many of his colleagues in Congress, when he contended the
territories were "treated as alien land; as a sort of
Botany Bay for the rest of the United States to which to
banish broken-down politicians and needy individuals." 24
Dakotans, especially those from the southern part of the
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territory after the settlement of the capital removal
issue, felt their individual rights were not protected
under this system of government.
Political grievances were numerous under the
territorial system of government and received the most
verbal criticism from the people.

Yankton resident

Joseph Ward clearly expressed his opinion
To hold any part of our country as a
Territory, is a violation of the fundamental
principles of our growth, is contrary to our
history, and is dangerous to our national
life. Local self-government is the characteristic of our national life, It is the one
feature that distinguishes us from other
nations. . . . Hence we see that the territorial system is a dangerous part of our
national life, because it is a constant menace
to the fundamental principle of our life, and
at the same time is building into dangerous
proportions the centralizing tendency that is
already too strong. Specifically it is
dangerous, because it takes away from large
bodies of citizens the privilege and the duty
of self government. Often these groups of
citizens are more numerous than those that have
a State government. Always they are equal in
virtue and intelligence. They may in some
cases excel in enterprise and sturdy vigor.
They are loyal to the nation, obeying all her
laws. In times of peril they quickly respond
to her call for help. They have borne the
first shock of savage uprisings; they have
patiently endured the ills that are inseparable
from the developing of new lands. No part of
our people exceed them in loving reverence for
the Fathers of the Republic. None are more
loyal to the fundamental principles of our
national life than those who are shut out from
a full share in our common inheritance until—
until when?^-5
Dakotans wanted to gain control of the political
structure.

Foremost in their minds was the ability to

66

elect their own officials, those they knew and trusted.
Elections would presumably bring officials to office on
the basis of merit, not through the national spoils
system.

Citizens resented the influx of alien appointees

from Washington with incompatible views.

By establishing

normal political representation, Dakotans felt they would
bring the government closer to its inhabitants, thereby
promoting

more responsible officials.

Local representa

tion would improve the local legislature, which would
devote itself to state projects and bring about more
effective utilitization of money and time.

The political

organization of the proposed state would not be burdened
by the Washington bureaucracy which, up to now, held veto
power on every proposition.

Furthermore, members of the

Dakota community would be able to send their own people
to Congress as voting members and they themselves would
have the right to vote in all national elections.
elections would also improve the judiciary.

Local

An increase

in the number and the quality of judges would contribute
to speedier trials, more timely decisions, and hence a
superior judicial system. °
Secondary to political oppression, financial restric
tions were imposed by the ineffective territorial govern
ment.

Dakotans felt that independence would advance a

stable, prosperous economy.

A principal injustice was

the subject of taxation, dictated by Washington.

The
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inhabitants of the territory felt they were taxed without
representation, considering the fact there were no voting
members from the territory in Congress.

Governor Arthur

C. Mellette, in his address to the Territorial Assembly
in 1885, summed up this frustration:

"Citizens of

Dakota," he said, "inherit the right of self-government
from the Pilgrim Fathers and the Huguenot exiles.

The

blood of their ancestors in the revolution cries out
against taxation without representation, while their own
blood and limbs left on freedom's battlefields entitles
them to freedom."2^

A system would be authorized to

curb county and municipal indebtness; and in all likeli
hood, salaries for elected state officials would be lower
than for appointed territorial officers.

The formation

of a new state would also enhance the value of property
within its boundaries, and stablize the state's
credit.2®
One economic and political problem, school lands,
was a major concern to Dakotans.

According to the

Organic Act, two sections (16 and 30) were set aside in
each township for schools.

Over years of territorial

neglect, these school lands were whittled away by
squatters, land speculators, and land companies.

Not

only was the land being sold for ridiculously low prices,
but the territory was not receiving the revenue.

In

addition, there was a decrease in school taxes, further
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compounding the difficulties.

Through the efforts of the

vigilant General William Henry Harrison Beadle, the
scandal was exposed.

His constant crusade at every level

of government was instrumental in saving the remaining
lands.

However, this problem remained a persistent

concern throughout the territorial period.

Dakotans

believed only a state government would effectively end
this destructive situation.
Thus, Dakota Territory, subject to an increasingly
intolerable colonial status, felt compromised by false
promises from Washington.

Considering that many Dakotans

were former residents of eastern states, they were keenly
aware of the principles of self-rule and were eager for
all Dakotans to enjoy the same privileges.

They compared

themselves with the colonial dependency the United States
experienced under George III.

Dakotans agreed with the

Utah Territorial Democratic delegate of the 1860's, Mr.
John F. Kinney, who compared the territories to
mere colonies, occupying much the same relation
to the General Government as the colonies did
to the British Government prior to the Revolu
tion. You give them the form of government,
but withhold from the people the right of
elective franchise. You appoint their
Governor, their secretary, their judges, their
marshal, and their district attorney, and too
often impose these officers upon them from a
class of men who have no interest in common
with the people, and know nothing of the trials
and struggles of their infant settlement.
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They wanted to be free from alien rule and economic
exploitation, to be in control of their own destiny.
Proponents of statehood also claimed that it would bring
not only political and economic freedom, it would
initiate increased immigration and possibly attract money
to the new state.
Impatience with the situation in Dakota Territory
thus grew intolerable as the years passed by.

Numerous

delegations traveled to the nation's capital; they
received excellent treatment and grand promises from
Washington politicians.

However, when the statehood

question came up for vote in Congress, political promises
absolutely fell through.

Time and time again Dakota's

hopes for statehood were frustrated.
A perfect opportunity for passage came during the
Forty-Seventh Congress, 1882-1883.

Dakotans optimisiti-

cally viewed this as the perfect opportunity because the
Republicans controlled both the House and the Senate, and
they had historically been sympathetic to the cause.

The

statehood bill was once again brought before Congress,
and the results were expected to be favorable.

Senators

confidently pointed to the plight of Dakota Territory.
As Republican Senator John J. Ingalls of Kansas stated,
I believe that all the objections which have
been hitherto urged against the passage of that
[statehood] bill are purely partisan and
malignant. . . . I have no doubt that if the
population of Dakota was not well known to be
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distinctively Republican, and that its admis
sion into the Union as a State would result in
an accession of two Republican Senators to this
body, that [statehood] bill would have been
long ago acted upon.-^'
Hopeful Dakotans were soon to be disappointed,
however, for a previously unpublicized problem surfaced.
Yankton County was involved with bonds issued through the
First National Bank of Brunswick, Maine.

In 1872, the

county floated railroad bonds in the amount of $200,000
to secure the construction of the Dakota Southern
Railroad from Sioux City, Iowa, to Yankton.
first railroad to serve Yankton County.

This was the

For several

years, Yankton County levied a tax for payment of the
interest on the bonds; their payment schedule was
prompt.

In 1881, however, Yankton stopped payment on the

bonds, claiming the railroads did not keep their contract
and the Territorial Legislature had issued the bonds
unlawfully in the first place.

Needless to say, the bank

brought suit against Yankton, going all the way to the
United States Supreme C o u r t . T h e

Court decided that

Yankton was responsible for the obligation previously
contracted.

The county then appealed to the Territorial

Assembly to assist in payment of the bonds.

The end

result of this untidy situation was that between Yankton
County and the Territorial Assembly, there was still
approximately $100,000 overdue in unpaid interest by the
year 1883.33
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Needless to say, this repudiation of the bonds was
enough to cause quite an uproar in the press and in
Congress.

Newspapers across the country reported

Dakota's failure to pay on these bonds.

The New York

Independent reminded "the people of Dakota that public
honesty is a cardinal qualification for both the right
and the capability of self-government."^
negative report came from the

Another

Philadelphia Press:

"there is no hurry about Dakota anyway, and in ten years
or more perhaps enough people who believe in paying debts
will have settled there, to enable the Territory to come
before Congress and the country with clean hands, and not
as now, dark with the stain of dishonesty.35
statements came from Congress.

Similar

In 1883, Republican

Senator Eugene Hale of Maine was so disgusted that he
promised Dakota would not be admitted to the Union until
it paid its debts.
The opposition to the admission of the
Territory of Dakota, so far as I was concerned,
had neither in it "partisanship" nor
"malignancy." I objected because an important
part of that Territory in its record in dealing
with its creditors was tainted with the worst
and most inexcusable form of repudiation.
I
objected further because that action of the
county of Yankton, an important part of the
Territory of Dakota, had been participated in
and sanctioned and indorsed by the Territorial
Legislature.^ b
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On the other hand, Preston B. Plumb, Republican Senator
from Kansas, had a slightly different point of view of
repudiation.
The town of Elizabeth, in New Jersey, and
the town of Rahway, in the same State— I
mention these because they are conveniently
near; I do not need to go west of the
Mississippi River for illustration— had
defaulted in their interest and in their
creditors during a long period of years. . . .
[it] was a great deal less than the people west
of the Mississippi River [Dakota] voluntarily
and cheerfully take upon themselves not only
for purpose of discharging their current obliga
tions but for the purpose of paying their
debts. . . . I want to take the towns in New
Jersey and in Maine and all over the country,
and ascertain just exactly how much the
practice of repudiation proves the unfitness of
a people for republican government. There
should be no reflection upon Dakota until the
communities now in the Union are thoroughly
purged.3'
The Yankton bond issue helped defeat Dakota's bid
for statehood in 1883.

Although Dakota had the support

of the Republican Party, statehood was not achieved
because of problems caused by the territory itself.

Both

the House and the Senate were reluctant to bring in
Dakota, after the territory was tainted with
repudiation.

Reports were also submitted to Congress

outlining the economic problems of the period, which were
compounded by the fact that the railroads were not
complete across the territory.
At the same time, Dakota Governor Nehemiah Ordway
vetoed the necessary constitutional convention.

He again

73

demonstrated the strength of his political machine, which
was backed by the powerful railroads and newspapers.

He

did not want statehood because he was satisfied with
keeping things the way they were, under his control.
Ordway dominated the single-state issue during his term
as governor (1880-1884).

After his appointment ended, he

moved to Washington where he coninued to support
Democratic policies.

When he left the territory, the

single-state advocates were left without their most vocal
leader; however, they were still strong enough to keep
the agitation active until statehood in 1889.

Between

the Yankton bondholders and Governor Ordway's veto,
Dakota was unable to gain statehood during the meeting of
the Republican dominated Senate and House.

What appeared

to be the most opportune moment, turned to failure.

The

result was predictable, and the second sesssion of
O O

Congress ended without a vote on statehood.-50
Led by Hugh C. Campbell and Joseph Ward, many
territorial residents now felt they had a right to
establish a state, with or without congressional
approval.

Their strongest argument, expressed in 1883

and continued until 1889, stemmed from their belief that
at least southern Dakotans felt like citizens of the
United States.

Philosophically, the people were "already

a state;" therefore, it was a mere formality for Congress
to make it legal.

They extended their arguments to point
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out historical precedents, for twelve states had hereto
fore been admitted to the Union without an enabling act
or Washington endorsement.^9

Dakota inhabitants felt

they were entitled to statehood by fulfilling the require
ments of population and size, and according to the
following qualifications, which they believed had been
met:
1. Ordinance of 1787, Article V. :
Whenever any of the said states shall have
60,000 free inhabitants therein, such State
shall be admitted by its delegates into the
Congress of the United States, on an equal
footing with the original States, in all
respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to
form a permanent Constitution and State
government.
2. Treaty with France regarding the
Louisiana Purchase, 1803: the inhabitants of
the ceded territory shall be incorporated in
the Union of the United States and admitted as
soon as possible . . . . to the enjoyments of
all the rights, advantages and immunities of
citizens of the United States. '
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford: There is
certainly no power given by the Constitution to
the Federal Government to establish or maintain
colonies bordering on the United States or at a
distance, to be ruled and governed at its own
pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits
in any way, except by the admission of new
States. . . . no power is given to acquire a
Territory to be held and governed permanently
in that character. . . . but to be admitted as
soon as its population and situation would
entitle it to admission.
It is acquired to
become a State, and not to be held as a colony
and governed by Congress with absolute
authority; and as the propriety of admitting a
new State is committed to the sound discretion
of Congress, the power to acquire territory for
that purpose to be held by the United States
until it is in a suitable condition to become a
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State upon equal footing with the older States,
must rest upon the same discretion. ^
Despite Governor Ordway, the Territory of Dakota was
extremely anxious to enter the Union as two manageable
states, not one large cumbersome state.

(Earlier

discussion pinpointed the numerous reasons the two
sections of the territory wanted independence from each
other.)

Thus, citizens were finally provoked, after

years of rejection, to take matters into their own
hands.

The southern part of the territory organized an

association under the title of the Dakota Citizens'
League; two conventions were called, in 1883 and 1885.
The 1883 results included, for southern Dakota, a consti
tution, capital in Yankton, restriction on the sale of
school lands, organization of a state government,
adoption of a prohibition platform, election of members
to Congress (Alonzo J. Edgerton and Colonel Gideon J.
Moody) and nomination of a host of state officials
(Arthur C. Melette, governor).

Under the League's plan

northern Dakota would be reorganized into the Territory
of Lincoln.

Submitted to the residents of the entire

Dakota Territory, the respective proposals were over
whelmingly approved, by a vote of 12,336 for and 6,814
against.

Critics of the plan claimed there was an

extremely light vote, since 30,000 settlers did not
bother to go to the polls.
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Many apathetic nonvoters saw the referendum as a
futile gesture, since it was taken without legal authori
zation.

The Republican Senate approved the plan, but

after the Democratic House ignored it, southern Dakota
tried again in 1885 with a revision of the 1883 plan.
The only outstanding new feature included a clause
(Section 32) promoted by moderates Alonzo J. Edgerton and
Colonel Gideon C. Moody, denying any unauthorized persons
or assemblage from launching a new government without
Congressional approval:
Nothing in this Constitution or Schedule
contained shall be construed to authorize the
legislature to exercise any powers except such
as are necessary to its organization, to elect
U.S. Senators, to provide and pass means and
measures necessary, preliminary and incident to
admission to the Union, and to assemble and
reassemble, and adjourn from time to time;
neither to authorize any officer of the execu
tive or administrative departments to exercise
any powers of his office except such as may be
preliminary and incident to admission to the
Union; nor to authorize any officer of the
judiciary department to exercise any of the
duties of of his office until the State of
Dakota shall have been regularly admitted into
the Union, except such as may be authorized by
the Congress of the United States. 4
This proviso was intended to placate Congress and remove
a radical taint from the action of the Dakota Citizens'
League.

The 1885 program was approved by the territorial

inhabitants on a vote of 25,138 pro and 6,527 con.^
In compliance with the technical qualifications, the
territory claimed in its own behalf an appropriate size,
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the proper size, adequate resources to sustain itself,
stable educational and religious organizations, numerous
newspapers, and sturdy, outstanding citizens with full
understanding of the virtues of statehood.

According to

the 1885 Journal of the House of the territorial
assembly,
Dakota has a population of 500,000; larger
than two Colorados, five Delawares, three
Floridas, twelve Nevadas, two New Hampshires,
three Oregons, two Rhode Islands or two
Vermonts.
It has a territory of 150,932 square
miles, equal to the combined area of Maine,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Ohio
and West Virginia, less 1,954 square
miles. . . Dakota pays more Internal Revenue
than four states; Delaware, Florida, Nevada,
Vermont; . . . more post office revenue than
thirteen states; New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Delaware, West Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Oregon, Nevada, District of Columbia;
[and] . . . has more banks and bank capital
than five states. Therefore, it is demon
strated beyond contradiction that we have the
territory, the population. ,and the resources to
entitle us to two states. D
The Republican Senate approved the statehood plan
but the Democratic House, pretending to be appalled by
such revolutionary action, rejected the southern Dakota
constitution.

Those Democrats added that the small vote

in the territory certainly did not represent the feelings
of the entire population.^
actions were fruitless.

in the long run, Dakota's

The territory was denied

statehood and even reprimanded for insolence.

The

constitutional conventions of 1883 and 1885, although
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approved by the Dakota Legislature, failed to receive the
4 ft

recognition necessary to secure statehood. u

Dakotans, ever impatient, decided to try to direct
their future themselves.

They started to consider the

possibility of taking Section 32 out of the document,
which presumbaly would allow them to establish a state
government without Congressional approval.

Territorial

reactions were mixed; many did not want to remove Section
32 as this would only aggravate Congress.
Needless to say, the doubters were correct.

When

congressmen got wind of this plan, they thought Dakota
was acting senselessly.

Benjamin Harrison, who had

introduced the original Senate bill, was unhappy with the
possibility of changing the constitution because it would
force the already approved bill to be re-submitted again
for approval in the Senate.

He wrote Moody, who had been

"elected" to Congress under the 1883 constitution, "I do
not need to say to you, for you know my views fully, that
an attempt to set up a state government in opposition to
your present Territorial government would be illegal and
ill advised.
Senate.

I could not defend that course in the

I believe it would alienate many of your

friends, and I would not be surprised if it ended forever
the proposition for the dis-union of Dakota."1^
Harrison also presented this question to Hugh J.
Campbell, one of the leaders of the illegal movement.

"I
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believe it would be a grave mistake to resoind Section 32
of your Ordinance, as far as it relates to Congressional
action.

Would it not require a re-submission of the

Constitution, as amended, to Congress and a new bill for
admission under your Constitution as amended?

If your

people shall modify the Constitution, which is referred
to and accepted in the bill which has passed the Senate,
that legislation it seems to me would fail".^0

Three

days later he again wrote to Moody, "it seems to me it
puts us in an attitude of insincerity.

We defended the

action of your people in the Senate last winter, chiefly
upon the provisions of Section 32, and insisted that they
did not intend to set up any state government until
Congress gave its consent.

To repeal that section now

looks like insincerity and, besides, it seems to me that
if the Convention modifies the Constitution which has
been submitted to Congress, and which the Senate has
accepted, the whole matter would have to be begun anew.
The instrument would be different.”^

Dakota was duly

reprimanded and the issue gradually diminished over the
next few years.
By now, 1886, Dakotans were discouraged and apathy
replaced the once vigorous desire to become a state.
Even former strong divisionists were giving up on their
goal to make Dakota Territory into two separate states.
The Grand Forks Plaindealer lamented to its readers that
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"the longer the territory remains undivided, the less
opposition there will be found to admission as a
whole.One

memorial, of uncertain origin,

complained that "we are tired of living in a political
graveyard.

We are tired of walking among political

skeletons.

We long for newer fields and greener pastures

upon the same ground but would have no 'divisions of the
farm'."^3
The reason for the decline in activity in the push
for statehood was not totally due to political discour
agement.

Granted, Dakotans were tired of submitting

unheeded memorials, and up to this point it made little
difference whether they advocated one or two states.
However, more personal, financial problems occupied the
average Dakotan.
1880's.

The economy was in decline in the late

The great depression of 1886 crippled the

economy nationally, causing a marked loss of investment
capital and a loss of confidence in business.

Each of

these factors affected Dakota Territory, still dependent
on eastern investors and markets.

In addition, Dakota

experienced crop failures from 1886 to 1889 because of
severe drought.

This situation was coupled with a

decline in the extensive railroad programs in the terri
tory; projected branch lines used to promote settlement
were simply not built because a lack of sufficient
investment capital and depressed markets.

This factor

81

seriously damaged the Dakota farmers’ situation because
they were not only unable to grow hea lthy crops, but th ey
had great difficulty getting the crop s to market.
no suprise that joining the Union as one state, two
states, or even becoming a state at a11, became a
secondary issue to farmers and busine ssmen who were
54
struggling to survive in a depressd economy.J

It is
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1Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,." in Dakota
Panorama, p. 189.
2
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Territories,
View of the Minority, Admission of Dakota, 49th Cong.,
1st sess., 1886, H. Rpt. 2577 (serial 2442), pp. 8-9R. M. Black, "History of the State Constitutional Conven
tion of 1889," Collections of the State Historical
Society of North Dakota 3 (1910):111-23. Black offers a
chronological account of all the memorials, petitions and
resolutions that passed through the Congress between 1871
and 1889. Everett W. Sterling, "The Bumpy Road to
Statehood," in Dakota Panorama, p. 363, hereinafter
referred to as "Bumpy Road" in Dakota Panorama, points
out that a longitutional division along the 100th
meridian was proposed. Altering the boundary to run
along the Missouri River was also considered. Various
names suggested for the northern part of the territory
were Pembina, Algonquin, and Lincoln. Southern Dakota
selfishly claimed the name Dakota. Lamar, Dakota
Territory, pp. 368-69; Kingsbury, History, 2:1612;
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:321; Loundsberry,
North Dakota History^ 1:368-69.
^Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:366;
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:321. Along with
the petitions, a variety of names for northern Dakota
were suggested. Pembina, an all-time favorite, was
offered in 1873, 1874, 1875, 1876, and 1879. U.S.,
Congress, House, Congressional Record, 43rd Cong., 1st
sess., 1874, 2, pt-! 5:4331 -32; U.S., Congress, Senate,
Congressional Record, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., 1880, 11,
p t . 1 : 11—12, 34; Cong. Record, 46th Cong., 3rd sess.,
pt. 2:1199. Northern or North Dakota received the most
attention and approval. It was petitioned in 1880. The
northern half did not wish to relinquish the name of
Dakota. U.S., Congress, House, Journal, 46 Cong., 2nd
sess., March 18, 1880, p. 804.
^Cong. Record, 43rd Cong., 1 sess., pt. 5:4331 32. There was an interesting discussion by Representa
tive Stewart about the question of female suffrage. The
bill concerning the establishment of the Territory of
Pembina (northern Dakota) allowed women to participate in
politics. Mr. Stewart is quoted:
The question of female suffrage is a
question that is being seriously considered by
a large portion of the people of the United
States. . . . Here is a new Territory to be
created and it is a good opportunity to try
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this experiment.
If it works badly, when the
Territory becomes a State there is nobody
committed. . . . If it works well, it may
spread elsewhere. It certainly can do no harm
in that country. There are very few people
there. . . . There is certainly no pressing
necessity for the establishment of this
Territory. I doubt the propriety of it very
seriously. As I said before, we are making too
many Territories. We are dividing this country
up into small subdivisions that never can
become States. But if we are to make this
Territory, it affords us an opportunity to try
a fair experiment on the subject of female
suffrage. This Territory is up in the far
North where people have to work pretty hard to
live.
It will be inhabited by a frugal and
industrious people necessarily, if it be
inhabited at all, and let this experiment there
be tried.
^Kingsbury, History, 2:1412-13; Hunkins, South
Dakota , pp . 115 — 1"5TI
^Sterling, ’’Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama, p.
363. Traditionally traffic crossed the territory in an
east-west mode. Railroads, major roads, trade routes,
even the telegraph followed the common trails. Even
after the railroads had advanced to the Missouri, northsouth travel was so inferior that persons commonly had to
go from northern Dakota to southern Dakota by way of St.
Paul, Minnesota.
It is interesting to note that travel
has changed very little since the territorial period.
Railroads and most roads still do not run north-south.
There are only a few exceptions.
Lamar, Dakota
Territory, p. 190.
"^Burleigh F. Spalding, "Constitutional Convention,
1889," North Dakota History 31 (July 1954):151. This
article was originally written late in the nineteenth
century. Spalding witnessed the events leading up to
statehood. However, North Dakota History gives no indica
tion as to exactly when the article was written nor where
it was found.
®Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 504508; Kingsbury, History, 2:1600. A powerful group of
men, commonly known in the territory as the Yankton
Oligarchy, were established in Yankton, southeastern
portion of southern Dakota Territory. They dominated
politics throughout the territorial period, declining
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after the capital was moved from Yankton to Bismarck in
1883. They favored dual statehood for the 'territory
during the entire territorial period. The most prominent
were: General D. M. Frost; J. B. S. Todd; Governor Newton
Edmunds (territorial governor, banker, land speculator);
Judge Gideon C. Moody (lawyer, Associate Judge of Dakota
Supreme Court, United States Senator); Governor A. J.
Faulk (territorial governor, businessman, clerk of the
United States District Court at Yankton, United States
Court Commissioner); Judge W. W. Brookings (lawyer, land
speculator, Associate Judge of Dakota Supreme Court,
representative of railroad interests); George H. Hand
(United States District Attorney for Dakota, lawyer,
territorial secretary); General W. H. H. Beadle (Dakota
School Superintendent, territorial surveyor general);
Reverend Joseph Ward (founder of Yankton College, leader
of the Dakota Congregational Church); Moses K. Armstrong
(editor Yankton Dakota Herald, congressional delegate);
Judge Jefferson P~. Kidder (lawyer, Associate Justice of
the Dakota Supreme Court, congressional delegate,
railroad speculator); Enos Stutsman (land speculator);
Judge Bartlett Tripp (lawyer, land and railroad
speculator, Chief Justice of the Dakota Supreme Court);
W. S. Bowen (editor, Yankton Press and Dakotan); George
W. Kingsbury (publisher of the Press and Dakotan);
Judge Alonzo J. Edgerton (lawyer^ United States Senator,
Chief Justice of the Dakota Supreme Court, railroad
interests); Doctor W. A. Burleigh (congressional
delegate, Indian agent); and Hugh J. Campbell (United
States District Attorney, lawyer). Kingsbury, History,
1:598-660; History, 2:1020-1476, 1760-95; Robinson,
History of North Dakota, pp. 197-216; Schell, "PoliticsPalaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp. 186-205;
Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 200-315;
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:211-13; Lamar,
Dakota Territory, pp. 247-^8; John Davis Unruh, "South
Dakota in 1889" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas,
June 1939), pp. 191-92; Armstrong, Early Empire
Builders, p p . 53-54.
^Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:31910Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 190-93; Robinson,
History of North Dakota, pp~ T90-98. Since the railroads owned 24 percent of the area of the northern
territory, their influence could not be ignored. Robert
S. Henry, "The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American
History Texts," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 32
(September 1945):194.
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^Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 504506; Hiram Drache, The Day of the Bonanza: A History of
Bonanza Farming in the Red River Valley of the North
(Fargo: North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies,
1964).
12Paxson, "Omnibus States," p. 83; Kingsbury,
History, 2:1598.
1^U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
50th Cong., 1st sess., 19, 3:3000. "Division Points,"
Grand Forks Herald, 9 August 1887, p. 2, col. 3. In
addition to the above institutions, enjoyment was also
segregated by two annual territorial fairs. U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Committee on Territories, Admission of
Dakota, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1888, S. Rept. 75
(serial 2519), pp. 1-3.
John Davis Unruh, "South Dakota
in 1889," p. 179. Payment of bonds, used to raise the
money to build the institutions, was deemed the
obligation of the respective section where the institu
tion was located. Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota
Panorama, pp. 365-67; Loundsberry, North Dakota
History, 1:366; Green "Struggle of South Dakota," p.*
1
5077!
^Green, "Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 504-506;
Kingsbury, History, 1:846-48; History, 2:1598-1600;
Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 109-221; Schell,
"Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp.
186-205; Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama,
p p • 363-64; Compendium, pp. 88-92; Briggs, Frontiers of
the Northwest, pp. 361-63; Lamar, Dakota Territory,
pp. viii, ix, 170-72, 190-92; Paxson, "Omnibus States,"
p. 83; Unruh, "South Dakota in 1889," pp. 178-79.
15u.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary
of the Interior, Report of the Governor of Dakota, 48th
Cong., 1st sess., 1883, FT Ex"! Doc. 1 (serial 2191), pp.
526-39; Ordway attempted to vindicate himself and his
Captiol Committee on the extremely negative press he
received during the capital removal issue.
l6Ibid., p. 527.
^Schell, Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota
Panorama, pp. 193-94; History of the Red River
Valley, p. 454; Federal Writers' Project of the Works
Progress Administration for the State of North Dakota,
North Dakota: A Guide To The Northern Prairie State (New
York: Oxford University Press, American Guide Series,
1950), p. 52; Daily Argus, April 5, 1883.
An
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excellent example of a public notice on the Capital can
be found in the Daily Argus, April 11, 1883. These
articles were found in the Dakota Territorial Papers,
Roll 70; see also within the same source, Supplement;
Dakota Affairs, An Address from the Executive of Dakota
in Defense of His Administration, March 30, 1883 > Roll
83. The Report of the Board of Capitol Commissioners to
the Governor and Legislative Assembly, of the Territory
of Dakota; January 24, 1885 (Bismarck, Dakota: Tribune,
Printers and Binders, 1885), contains details of all bids
and considerations in the capital issue.
After the bids were submitted and Bismarck was
accepted as the new capital, the Commission authorized
the sale of 994 platted lots, anticipating $250,000.
However, only 245 lots sold, generating only $38,849 in
In constructing the capitol building, expenses
revenue,
amounted to $138,849. The $38,849 in lot sales plus the
initial $100,000 from Bismarck citizens paid the bills;
however, the whole capital removal issue caused financial
problems for many years.
^®Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:366-75;
Robinson, History of North Dakota, p. 201; Kingsbury,
History of Dakota, 2:1475; Lamar, Dakota Territory,
pp. 202-41; Paxson, "Omnibus States," p. 83; Schell,
"Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp.
193-94, 211; Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp.
513-14. Ordway also wanted a seat in the U.S. Senate and
he believed his chances were excellent, provided the
territory entered the Union as one state. It was also
rumored that Ordway received $30,000 from the Northern
Pacific Railway for assisting in the capital removal. A
close friend of Ordway, Alexander McKenzie, was one of
the most visible Northern Pacific political agents in the
territory. A frequent traveler between Bismarck and
Minneapolis/St. Paul (Northern Pacific headquarters),
McKenzie carried on most of the negotiations pertaining
to the capital issue. Often called the "Boss of North
Dakota," he was a natural leader.
1Q

^Robinson, History of North Dakota, p. 202.
Eastern investors had invested millions in Dakota and
they were unwilling to have their debtors control the
loans. The railways enjoyed the flexible territorial
railroad laws which could be controlled in Washington.
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 208-209, 250-51.
20

Kingsbury History of North Dakota, 1:413-15;
Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama, p. 368.
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Robinson, History of North Dakota, p. 202;
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 208-9; Paxson, "Omnibus
States," pp. 83-84.
2 2 Loundsberry,

North Dakota History, 1:368-71.

^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls" in Dakota
Panorama, p. 188-89.
p ji

Cong. Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., pt.
7:6459. Hatred of the territorial officials was under
standable for these restless people. However, Pomeroy,
Territories, pp. 107-8, presents a clear picture of the
officials, pointing out that although there were some
corrupt individuals, most appointees were dedicated
persons who faced many obstacles. A harsh climate,
inhospitable neighbors, a critical legislature, and poor
payment for service were realistic barriers.
Pomeroy
believed that territorial governments would have faced
even more severe problems without the assistance of these
officials.
“^Joseph Ward, "The Territorial System of the
United States," Andover Review: A Religious and
Theological Monthly, TO (1 8 8 8 ): 51 , 55~.
2 ^Ibid., pp. 52-53; Green, "Struggle of South
Dakota," pp. 520-521; Schell, "Politics— Palaver and
Polls," in Dakota Panorama, p. 194; Loundsberry, North
Dakota History, 1:365. Inhabitants of the territory
viewed the national political arena with more enthusiasm
than local politics. Colonial dependence made Dakotans
acutely aware that national issues and individuals
directly affected the territory. A we 3 k voice and no
voting power frustrated territorial settlers, who
desperately wanted to be on the same footing with other
states. Pomeroy, Territories, pp. 99-100; Robinson,
History of North Dakota, pp. 199-201.
2 ^Kingsbury,

History, 2:1757.

PR°Further discussion of the economic and political
problems are found in Ward, "Territorial Systems," pp. 523; and Goodspeed, The Province and the States, 6:31419. See also Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 237-41;
Kingsbury, History, 2:1596, 1656-57.
^Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama ,
pp. 363-66; Green, "Struggle of South Dakota," p. 508;
Unruh, "South Dakota in 1889," pp. 200-1; Schell,
"Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, p.
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188. The territorial superintendent of public instruc
tion, Gereral William Henry Harrison Beadle, thought
school land should be sold for no less than ten dollars
per acre. The proper authorities, Congress and the
Territorial Assembly, were negligent in their protection
of school lands. More could have been done if these
bodies would have taken a firm stand. According to the
Organic Act, two sections in each township were set aside
for future schools. Laws of Dakota , 1862, pp. 21-28.
See also General William Henry Harrison Beadle to Alvin
Sanders, U.S. Senate, January 18, 1882, Papers Relating
to Dakota Territory, Manuscript Division, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
^Delegate John F. Kenney of Utah, Cong. Globe,
38th Cong., 1st sess., 2:1171.
3 1 U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
47th Cong., 2nd sess., 1883, 147 Pt"* 1:870.
^First Na tional Bank of Brunswick v. Yankton
County, 11 Otto, (U.S.) 129 (1882).
33u.S., Congress, Senate, Protest of Bondholders
of Yankton County, Dakota, Against The Admission of said
Territory as a Stated 47th Cong., 1st sess., 1882, S7
Mis". Doc. 613 (1 993 ), pp. 1-8.
3**New York Independent, 6 April 1882, p. 2.
•^Philadelphia Press, 21 March 1882, p. 1.
3^Cong. Record, 47th Cong., 2nd sess., pt.
1: 8 7 0 .

37u.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
47th Cong., 1st sess., 1882, 137 Pt7 3:2277-78.
3®Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 213-14;
Paxson, "Omnibus States," p. 827 90; Unruh, "South Dakota
in 1888," p. 188-89; Green, "Struggle of South Dakota,"
pp. 510-12; Cong. Record, 47th Cong., 1st sess., pt.
2:2045. For more on the Yankton bonds, see Samuel Ware
Packard, Dakota, Statement of Facts in Support of the
Protest Made by the Yankton County Bondholders Against
the Admission of Dakota (n.p., 1888), p p . 1-32; A Protest
Against the Admission of Dakota as A State; Signed the
First National Bank of Brunswick, Maine; A. H. Merryman
and 20 Other Bondholders (n.p., 18 8 2 ), pp. 1-15; Opinions
of the Press. As to the Propriety of Congress Admitting
Dakota at the Present Time (n.p., 1882), pp.1-22.
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Opinions of the Press contained choice articles from
major newspapers across the country.
Just the titles of
the articles give adequate reflection of the public
opinion of the issue: "Most Remarkable Exhibition of
Financial Juggling on Record," Buffalo Express
(Republican), April 1, 1882; "The Repudiation of These
Bonds Is An Act of Flagrant Dishonesty Which Congress
Should Openly Condemn By Refusing To Admit The Territory
As State Until The Last Cent Of Debt Is Paid,"
Indianapolis Times (Republican), April 3, 1882; "Let
Dakota Wait For A Century If Need Be Until Its People Are
Ready To Pay their Debts," New York Tribune, March 23,
1882; "The Dakota Conspiracy--Party Lines," New York
Herald, March 24, 1882; "It Seems As Though The
Repudiation Chickens Were Coming Home To Roost," Chicago
Inter-Ocean (Republican), March 22, 1882; "There Is No
Valid Reason For Making This Territory Into A State
Anyway; But If She Must Come In, Let It Be With Clean
Hands," New York Sun, March 21, 1882.
•^The twelve states were: Vermont, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Wisconsin,
California, Kansas, Oregon, and Nevada. Campbell
contended that the power to frame a constitution and
state government was sanctioned by the Ordinance of
1787. The government could be operating before the state
was admitted to the Union. Cong. Record, 50th Cong.,
1st sess., pt. 3:2999; Kingsbury, History, 2:1657,
1765; Robert F. Karolevitz, Challenge: The South Dakota
Story (Sioux Falls: Brevet Press, Inc., 1975), herein
after referred to as Challenge, pp. 171-75; Unruh,
"South Dakota in 1889,” pp. 1^0 — 91; Green, "Struggle of
South Dakota," pp. 521-22; Memorial to Dakota Legislature
1885, pp. 4, 7-8; P. C. Shannon, The State of Dakota:
How It May Be Formed; Replies to the Pamphlet of Hon.
Hugh J. Campbell, U.S. Attorney of Dakota, Treating Upon
the Above Subject (Yankton, D.T.: Herald PrintingHouse,
1883), hereinafter referred to as The State of Dakota,
pp. 4-5. Campbell tended to be the most radical of the
territorial statehood advocates. He consistantly
demanded that the territory had a right to be brought
into the Union; he was impatient with the drawn-out
political process. Goodspeed, The Province and the
States, 6:314-19.
^ An Act Establishing the Territorial Government
of Wisconsin, 31-50. Ward, "Territorial System of the
United States," pp. 59-61; Armstrong, Early Empire
Builders, pp. 31-50.
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^Ward, "Territorial System of the United States,"
pp. 59-61; Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts
of the United States of America, vol. 2, "Treaty for
the Cession of Louisiana," No. 86, 30 April 1803, PP* 498511.
^Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard (U.S.), 445-51
(1 857).
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
48th Cong., 2nd sess., 1884, 16"j pt. 1: 107-111 ;
Admission of Dakota, H. Rpt. 2577 (serial 2442), pp. 1(Ti Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 213-19;
Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 197-212;
Karolevitz, Challenge, pp. 171-75; Hunkins, South
Dakota, p. 117; Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 234-57;
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:321; Compen
dium , p . 9^T!
^Cong., Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., pt.
3:2999.
^u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on
Territories, Admission of Dakota, 49th Cong., 1st
sess., 1886, ST Rpt. V5 (serial 2355), pp. 22-68; U.S.,
Congress, House, Committee on Territories, Minority
Report, Admission of Dakota, 49th Cong., 1st sess.,
1886, H. Rpt. 2577 (serial 2442), pp. 4-9; Journal of the
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention Held Under
An Act of the Legislature at Sioux Falls, Dakota,
September, 1S85. A. J. Edgerton, President, John Cain,
Secretary (Sioux Falls, Dakota: sT T\ Clover, Sioux
Falls Leader, 1885); Karolevitz, Challenge, pp. 173-75;
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 252, 368—69T Compendium,
p. 95.
^Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 50821; Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama, p. 363;
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 194—99; Chicago Tribune,
October 1, 1885, p~I 9~.
Cong. Record^ 48th Cong., 2nd
sess., pt. 1:107—111 and Journal of the House, 16th
sess., Legislative Assembly, Dakota, 1885, pp. 125-37,
both contain detailed reports on the good conditions of
Dakota Territory. Also see the complete selection by
Shannon, The State of Dakota.
^Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 213-19;
Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 197-202.
Opposition to the 1883 and 1885 documents was strong,
including from the governor, Ordway; railroad boss,
McKenzie; powerful eastern and territorial newspapers;
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and of course the Democrats, locally and nationally. In
addition, failure to get the constitution accepted
indicated a decline in the power of the Yankton
Oligarchy.
Recent immigrants were less politically
minded and were not inclined to support radical programs
to be admitted to the Union. The Citizen's League was
still confined to selected individuals and had not
identified itself with the settlers in the territory.
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 234-36; Sterling, "Bumpy
Road," in Dakota Panorama, p. 363; Shannon, The State
of Dakota, pp . 3-68.
^Report of the Governor of Dakota, pp. 52326; U.S~ Congress, House, Committee on Territories,
Admission of Dakota, Minority Report, 50th Cong., 1st
sess., 1888,
Rpt. 709 (serial 2600), p. 85.
^Benjamin Harrison to G. M. Moody, May 15, 1886,
Benjamin Harrison Papers (microfilm), Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington D. C., Roll 7.
Hereinafter cited as Harrison Papers.
5°Benjamin Harrison to Hugh J. Campbell, June 5,
1886, Harrison Papers, Roll 7.
^Benjamin Harrison to G. C. Moody, June 8, 1886,
Harrison Papers, Roll 7. Many individuals in the terri
tory were uneasy about the steps taken to set up the
state government without first receiving permission from
Congress. Benjamin Harrison wrote to several leaders in
the territory about the problem. Also in the Harrison
papers, see Benjamin Harrison to John A. Owen, May 27,
1886, Roll 49; Benjamin Harrison to A. C. Mellette, May
27, 1886, Roll 49; Benjamin Harrison to V. V. Barnes,
June 5, 1886, Roll 49; and Benjamin Harrison to A. C.
Mellette, December 6, 1886, Roll 50.
^ Grand Forks Plaindealer, 11 March 1886, p.
4; also see 15 July 1886, p^
and 10 August 1887,
p. 4. Another northern newspaper, the Grand Forks
Herald, was very clear in its feelings about the
possibility of remaining one large state.
It listed the
numerous dual institutions and associations from doctors
and lawyers to the fireman's organization. The article
indicated there was nothing common in the territory
except "an inadequate and inefficient government organiza
tion." Grand Forks Herald, 9 August 1887, p. 2.
-^Memorial, State of Dakota , 1885. I have no
information about this document, who wrote it or where it

92

came from.
I found it in the New York Public Library in
a group of pamphlets.
54Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 428.

CHAPTER V
SUCCESS AND STATEHOOD

In the raid-1 880’s, Dakotans faced a seemingly
hopeless situation.

Congress had steadfastly ignored

their pleas for statehood; and although Dakotans looked
to the Republican Party for support and leadership, a
single champion of the cause had yet to emerge.

Finally

Benjamin Harrison, senior senator from Indiana and
chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, filled
the role of Dakota’s most active and influential backer
for division and statehood.

It was because of his

interest that a bill admitting southern Dakota into the
Union finally passed the Senate in 1886.1

His devotion

to southern Dakota is readily apparent in his speeches
and his letters to the territory.

He did not necessarily

reject northern Dakota as much as he simply ignored that
section of the territory.

However, his fiery speeches

underlined the unfair delay of statehood for 300,000
deserving people.

He contended they had the proper

resources and population sufficient to support both a
state and congressmen in Washington.

He eloquently

defended the position of dual statehood:
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I repeat that when Senators spend their
time in arguing such propositions and then
offer amendments that are not calculated to
test the popular support of this constitution
or to test the popular opinion in Dakota as to
division, but assuming those questions them
selves, the one dividing the Territory upon the
Missouri River and the other denying the
division altogether, they are not sincere when
they put their opposition upon the ground that
there is not a popular acquiescence in this
The Senator from Vermont [Mr.
movement
Edmunds] asks me if there have been any
memorials remonstrating against the division.
Not a popular convention, not a meeting of
agriculturists, not a religious association of
any kind, no body of men met together in North
or in South Dakota have ever protested against
this division. On the other hand, before it
could be a question of politics, before any man
could know what the politics of the States to
be formed out of that Territory could be, her
people settled upon the idea of division, and
by memorials from their Legislature to
Congress, by legislative enactments which
assumed it for eleven years, have poured in
upon Congress one uninterrupted and uniform
expression in favor of division.
Harrison's efforts were frustrated in the Democratic
controlled House of Representatives under the leadership
of Democrat William M. Springer of Illinois, member of
the House Committee on the Territories and Chairman of
the House Committee of the Whole.

Springer did not

particularly want to bring in any new states at that
time, much less two with Republican tendencies.
Realizing, however, that the prospective new states could
not be kept out indefinitely, he devised and introduced
on December 13, 1886, the Omnibus Bill, "a bill (H.R.
10225) to enable the people of Dakota, Montana,
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Washington, and New Mexico to form constitutions and
State governments, and to be admitted into the Union on a
legal footing with other States. . . ."^

Springer's

Omnibus bill proposed to admit four states, undivided
Dakota, Montana, Washington, and New Mexico.

Dakota and

Montana were expected to Republican, while Washington and
New Mexico were expected to be Democrat.1* This would
mean each party got two states, and party advantage would
remain unchanged, if Dakota remained undivided.^
Representative Springer, who up to now was against
any new states, therefore introduced the bill to admit
Dakota as one state.

He realized that he had no alter

native but to follow the change in the political climate
and within the Democratic Party.

The public was better

informed about the western territories and was much more
verbal about keeping deserving citizens out of the
Union.

It is no surprise that Washington politicans,

keenly aware of this development of public opinion, were
not interested in making the territorial situation an
issue in the next election.

Springer was more or less

following the new Democratic policy, to bring in new
states as soon as they fulfilled the proper requirements;
privately, however, the party supported the the program
which brought in states in pairs to keep the parties in
the same relative position in the House and Senate.
Springer ended up the voice of the single-state plan, now
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apparently a strong supporter for statehood for the
territories.

It was an ironic switch in events.

Nevertheless, it seemed that Democrat support for a
single state was in some ways another way to prolong the
statehood issue.

The old program of ignoring the terri

tories, listing fabricated reasons why they were not
ready for statehood, could now be traded for a new
delaying tactic, one that argued whether or not the
Territory of Dakota should come in as one or two states.
This new plan could delay the possibility of statehood
once again.

Springer gained strength with his one-state

plan, in part by an event which occurred in the
territory.
In November 1887, the territorial legislature
submitted a referendum to the people of Dakota on the
question of whether or not division was desired.
Although the measure passed and division was agreed upon,
the majority of the northern Dakotans voted against
division.^

The one-state supporters in Dakota and in

Washington were elated after the returns were analyzed.
They claimed that even though the divisionists won the
referendum, the margin was very narrow, indicating that
non-voters were either against division or did not care
one way or another.

Springer therefore declared it was

the duty of Congress to protect the ’’existing union"
rather than divide the territory against the will of so
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many of its inhabitants.

"I have earnestly desired,"

Springer continued, "and still desire, the admission of
Dakota, and will continue to oppose, her dismemberment
while some of her citizens, perhaps interested in locali
ties that may be affected by

division, may criticize my

course at this time; yet I feel assured that hereafter
those who have insisted on single admission will be
regarded as benefactors of the Territory.
Observers in the territory had another explanation
of the results.

Counties influenced by the Northern

Pacific Railroad, which desired only one state, were
inclined to vote against division, indicating the
pressure of the railroad.

On the other hand, counties

served by the Manitoba and Great Northern lines produced
votes favoring division.

Thomas Niell, resident of

northern Dakota, claimed that single-state backers were
working in the counties before the election and convinced
voters that if they were insistent on division, South
Dakota would go in as a state, leaving North Dakota a
territory with no promise of statehood in the near
future.

This was not exactly the slant of the statehood

bills; however, most Congressmen were inclined to estab
lish southern Dakota as a state and to allow northern
Dakota to come in at a future time, generally believed to
Q
be within a year or so.
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Single-state advocates were persuasive in their
arguments supporting one large state.

They believed the

state could be run less expensively as a single large
state rather than two small ones.

One efficient bureau

cracy was preferable since it could draw the most
qualified individuals from the total area.

The large

state would also have more weight in Washington, putting
it into a better position to deal with older and larger
states.

Washington's Democratic politicians claimed that

support for dual statehood was simply not there; they
could not take it upon themselves to grant the wishes of
the so-called fragmented group of southern Dakotans, they
needed to look after the interests of the entire
population.

Senator George G. Vest, Democrat from

Missouri, stated in Congress:
I pledge my word and honor here, and I
believe that every Democrat present will do the
same, I will vote for the admission of Dakota
as one State; but I will not vote for the
division of Dakota, because I believe that no
consideration of public policy demands it. I
believe that State will not be too large,
considering its climate and soil. We have
heard the most extravagant panegyric on the
soil, the climate, the people of Dakota.
Notwithstanding what we know of that region we
have heard here of roses and flowers and
cloudless skies and balmy zephyrs. We have
heard of a people so elevated, so honest, so
civilized, so Christianized that hardly any
population in this country can be brought in
safe comparision with them.^
Democrats proclaimed they were looking out for the
interests of the entire population.

Besides, prospects
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seemed brighter if Congress could bring in one state
expeditiously whereas two states would take more time.
Washington Democrats reflected that Dakotans should be
willing to go this route, as it was preferable to
indefinite territorial status. 10 The final results
proved that the members of the House became side-tracked
once again; they were reluctant to bring the state into
the Union because of its internal disagreements.

The

bill granting statehood was shelved, and support for the
measure dissolved.

Dakotans again felt statehood, either

as one large state or two smaller states, was in the
distant future.

However, the Presidential election of

1888 was awaited with great anticipation.

Perhaps a new

Republican administration would fulfill the statehood
dream. 11
'
Benjamin Harrison, the Republican Presidential
candidate, who had been a firm supporter of the Dakotans
in the Senate, suspected partisanship rather than lack of
readiness prevented Dakota territory from entering the
Union.

"Democrats in the House are determined to control

government at any cost," he remarked in 1887," and they
will not consent to the admission of the new territory
which might by any probability cast its electoral vote
for the Republican Presidential ticket." 1P

Republicans

emphasized their support when they put the statehood
issue in the 1888 Republican Presidential platform, which
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called for South Dakota statehood and enabling acts for
North Dakota, Montana, and Washington.

They were, in

effect, advocating the admission of three Republican
states and only one Democratic, which would change the
party balance by providing Republicans a net gain of two
s ta te s .

^3

it was not difficult for Democrats to see

through that this plan.
Victory in 1888 for Republicans therefore meant
victory for Dakota Territory as well.

As it turned out,

the Republicans swept the election, capturing the
Presidency and a majority in both the House and Senate of
the Fifty-first Congress.

They were determined to

fulfill their platform promises to the long-suffering
territories.

Lame-duck Democrats, on the other hand,

were anxious to salvage something of their Omnibus Bill,
and they tried to compromise by admitting two Dakotas
plus Montana, Washington, and New Mexico, three
potentially Republican states and two potentially
Democratic states, for a Republican net gain of one
state.

Realizing the President could call a special

session in the spring, and pondering the complexion of
the Fifty-first Congress, they decided to try to bring in
the territories, including southern Dakota, during the
lame-duck session of the Fiftieth Congress; after all, a
small Democratic victory was certainly preferable to a
total Republican triumph.

As for North Dakota, it would
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simply have to wait its turn.

Charles H. Grosvenor,

Republican Representative of Ohio, declared it was "too
late for the Democratic party to shield themselves from
the wrath of the people due to their betrayal of their
trust in the matter of the Territories, for lo these four
full years of Democratic administration the Territory of
Dakota has been ready for admission to the Union. . . .
She has been kept out of the Union because she is not
barbarous and treacherous, nor Democratic . . . with the
hope that the power of the Democratic party might be
protected for four more years.
The Democrats called a caucus in December 1888 to
plan their strategy.

After much debate, a plan was

agreed to that called for one Dakota, unless its people
demanded two; provided for rapid admission of Washington,
Montana and New Mexico as states; and allowed the admit
tance of Utah in the future.^
On January 15, 1889, Representative Springer, still
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole in the lame-duck
session, introduced the Omnibus Bill to the House and
opened the floor to discussion.

The majority of the

speakers repeated the major arguments in defense of
Dakota, with little time spent discussing Montana and
Washington.

However, New Mexico presented a problem.

When its merits were investigated, many members felt this
territory was not ready to become a state because New
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Mexicans did not have sufficient resources .nor did
Congress feel the "half-breeds" were choice candidates
for members of the Union.1®

Other members, however,

agreed with Representative William Warner, Republican of
Missouri.

"I honestly doubt— the propriety of admitting

New Mexico as a State," he announced, "yet if I am driven
to vote for New Mexico in order to get in the Dakotas,
Montana, and Washington, I would rather err on the side
of favoritism to the people of New Mexico than to longer
continue this burning outrage upon the people of the
other Territories."1^

Representative Byron M.

Cutcheon, Republican from Michigan contended, "I am
utterly, positively and forever opposed to tying this
carcass of New Mexico upon the living body of Dakota.
Let it stand on its own basis.
own merit."1®

Let each stand upon its

Although many Republican members tried

to eliminate the comprehensive Omnibus Bill, with the
undesirable New Mexico included, it passed the House in
its Democratic form on January 18, 1889-1^
The Senate version of the Omnibus Bill then traveled
through the Senate Committee on the Territories, no
longer chaired by Senator Harrison, only to be rejected
by the Republican-dominated full Senate because of the
statehood provision that included New Mexico.

A confer

ence of the two houses was called but proved temporarily
unable to break the dead-lock between the Republican
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Senate and the Democratic House.

Finally, when the

session was almost over, House Democrats conceded
everything the Senate wanted.

In fact, Congressman

Springer changed his stand completely.

He stated, "As

the course of empire is rapidly moving westward, let us
prepare our territories for the coming tide of
population.

Let us clothe them with all the habiliments

of statehood.

Let us extend to their people all the

rights which we of the states e n j o y . A s

one

unidentified observer remarked, "the Democrats seemed to
be ready to give up everything for which they have held
on, and even implore the Republicans for permission to
give up more, in order to make the new states a feature
of this Congress instead of the next." P 1

The final

Omnibus Bill that emerged from the House was fully
satisfactory to neither party.

On January 18, 1889 the

House passed the Senate version of the statehood bill,
S. 185, changing it in the process to fit House
pp

requirements.

A Committee of Conference, including Springer, then
met to reconcile conflicting House-Senate versions of the
bill, and both Houses agreed to back down, agreeing to
the final Senate bill, which, however, now looked
something like the House B i l l . S p r i n g e r still fought
to include New Mexico so that Democrats might anticipate
two new states; however, in the end he failed, and the

final bill proposed statehood for three potentially
Republican states and only one potentially Democratic
state.

(As it turns out, the Democratic defeat was even

worse, for Washington elected a Republican delegation to
the Fify-first Congress.

Springer, a Democrat, sponsored

a House bill that finally gave the Republicans four new
states.)

The Moderates and some other Democrats felt

they were forced to accept the situation, and they voted
accordingly, helping, for example, to exclude New
Mexico.

Springer and the majority of Democrats, however,

fought to keep in New Mexico, and when that effort
failed, they attempted to defeat the proposal (item 12)
and postpone the admission of North Dakota, Montana, and
Washington by allowing them to write a constitution and
form state governments, then requiring further
congressional approval.

This would postpone admission at

least for a time; if apathy developed, it might be a long
time.

On the other hand, Moderates and Republicans

successfully overcame this challenge; on February 15,
1889, they secured House passage of an amendment bringing
in North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington on
"equal basis", requiring only a Presidential proclamation
that a proper constitution had been written and approved
by the people and that state governments were formed
before the territory actually became a state.

The bill

dropped New Mexico; and it admitted two Dakotas without a
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.
2U
new vote on division by the people of the territory.
When Republicans forced the exclusion of New Mexico, the
balance read three potential Republican states (the
Dakotas and Montana) to one potential Democratic state
(Washington), a Republican gain of two states.

For

Dakota, the long struggle ended when President Cleveland,
a Democrat, signed the bill on February 22, 1889, during
pn

his last weeks in office. -^
It is interesting to note the sequence of events
during the early months of 1889*
pattern of the Democrats.

One can readily see the

They changed from being

totally against statehood for Dakota, to backers of the
single-state plan, finally trying to emerge as the final
champions, bringing four new states into the Union.

They

only changed their plans when they were forced by the
Republicans.

Dakotans finally entered the Union as two

states, something most of them had tried to do for
eighteen years.
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The government by Congress of the Terri
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that they may become States in the Union;
therefore, whenever the conditions of popula
tion, material resources, public intelligence
and morality are such as to insure a stable
local government therein, the people of Such
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inherent in them to form for themselves consti
tutions and State government, and be admitted
into the Union. Pending the preparation for
Statehood, all officers thereof should be
selected from the bona-fide residents and
citizens of the Territory wherein they are to
serve. South Dakota should of right be
immediately admitted as a State in the Union
under the consitution framed and adopted by her
people, and we heartily indorse the action of
the Republican Senate in twice passing bills
for her admission. The refusal of the
Democratic House of Representatives, for
partisan purposes, to favorably consider these
bills is a willful violation of the sacred
American principle of local self-government,
and merits the condemnation of all just men.
The pending bills in the Senate to enable the
people of Washington, North Dakota and Montana
Territories to form constitutions and establish
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unnecessary delay. The Repulican party pledges
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now qualified, as soon as possible, and the
others as soon as they may become so.
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It is interesting that both of these men,
however vocal in the Congressional Record, voted
against statehood issues in at least 75 percent of the
statehood-related roll-calls. Representative Cox is
quoted as saying,I
I meant to say this, that gentlemen who
are really patriotic, who desire to help these
people in their enterprises, who are proud of
the progress of our people in all that makes up
modern civilization, might defer a little to
the general sentiment of the country just now,
and if we cannot get all that we want in any
one measure, let us refer centain matters of a
local character to those amendments which come
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of the Territories to be
States.

hed in these

Cong., Record, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., pt. 1: 938.
Mr. MacDonald was also very verbal on the territorial
question for the Dakotas.
Now, I know personally that the Terr itory
of Dakota is ready for admission as two States,
and that what we understand to be South Dakota
and North Dakota are each of them separately
anxious to be admitted as free and independent
States, and are each in favor of division
almost (if not actually) unanimously. But sir,
as I said before, I am desirous to have action
taken by this Congress, and especially of
seeing Dakota admitted soon as two States. A
great injustice has been done the people of
Dakota by their admission being delayed so
long. It would do no good to discuss the
causes of this delay.
I hold that it has been
because other measures were given preference,
to its exclusion, and not because of political
bias, as has been claimed. But let that pass.
Let us act, and by respecting each other, aim
to secure the passage of a bill as the majority
desires.
Cong,, Record, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., pt. 1:899-900.
20

Cong., Record, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., pt.

1:951.
^ 1Kingsbury, History, 2:1870.
PPU.S., Congress, House, Journal, 50th Cong.,
2nd sess., January 18, 1889, PP^ 296-97.
^House Journal, 50th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 20, 1889, pp. 561-70, 583, 584.
Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 2nd sess.,
pt. 2:1 940; House Journal, 50th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 15, 1889, p^ 64b.
^Kingsbury, History, 2:1873. He reported that
President Cleveland signed the bill with a quill pen that
was plucked from the wing of an eagle killed in North
Dakota.
It was also reported that when the bill for

statehood was finally passed there was great enthusiasm
in the halls of Congress. Papers and books were thrown
in the air in celebration.

CHAPTER VI
CONGRESSIONAL ALIGNMENTS

Ironically, the Democrats, who were responsible for
the ultimate achievement of statehood for the two
Dakotas, were also (as most sources used indicate),
responsible for the long delay.

Using Rice-Beyle cluster

bloc analysis, this conclusion can be tested precisely by
measuring the extent to which each Representative voted
with every other Representative, grouping together in a
bloc those whose voting behavior tended to be similar.
In order to qualify for membership in a particular bloc,
each legislator must vote the same as all other members
of the bloc on at least eighty percent of the twelve
pertinent statehood roll calls.

Fringe members for each

bloc are those who agreed on at least seventy percent of
the votes, with at least fifty percent of the members of
the bloc.

A complete list of the relevant roll calls is

in Appendix 2.
The members of the House divided into three blocs
(see Table 1).

The first, composed of members who were

strong supporters of Dakota Territory, favored two
states.

Its membership included 132 Republicans and one
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Democrat for a total of 133 members.

The fringe

consisted of six more members, five Republicans and one
Democrat.

These legislators will be called

Divisionists.

TABLE 1
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY PARTY*
STATEHOOD ISSUE

REPUBLICANS
DIVISIONIST

132

( 98%)

1

1

TOTAL

1%)

1
1

133 ( 49%)

DEMOCRATS
1 (

MODERATE

1

(

1%)

14 ( 10%)

1

ANTI-STATEHOOD

2

(

1%)

119 ( 89%)

1
1

1

15 (

6%)

121 ( 45%)

1
1

(100%)

134 (100%)

1
1

269

/-- -

135

**
o
o

TOTAL

*In this, as in all tables, the fringes are not tabu
lated. Also not included are the members who did not
have sufficient voting records. A complete list of these
members can be found in Appendix 4.

The second, Moderate, bloc was a very small group
with only 15 members, including 14 Democrats (with four
more in the fringe) and one Republican (with none in the
fringe).

It is perhaps somewhat misleading to set this

group aside as a separate bloc because it usually voted
with the third bloc; the only difference was that the
members were more or less willing to cooperate with
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Republicans for the purpose of providing the Dakotas with
statehood and evidently wanted to claim some credit for
achieving it.
The third bloc disapproved of statehood for all of
Dakota Territory.

It continually voted against the

measures that would facilitate speedy admission.

Of the

121 members, only two were Republicans, while 119 were
Democrats.
Democrat.

The fringe, consisting of 10 members, was all
This is an anti-statehood bloc, in the sense

that it opposed separate statehood for North Dakota.
Table 1 indicates that the Republicans were over
whelmingly in favor of the statehood question while the
Democrats appear to be almost equally polarized against
it.

This general table cannot serve as our only basis

for analysis because it does not indicate whether or not
there was any sectional voting.
Table 2 indicates that both North-South and EastWest splits, showing most northerners (69 percent)
supported statehood, while southerners were closer to
unanimity on the opposite side of the issue (84 percent);
however, some of this heavy southern influence is
explained by the behavior of the Democratic solid South.
Of the 92 representatives from the States of the
Confederacy plus Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, and
Missouri, 81 were Democrats and only 11 were
Republicans.

The East-West division is less defined,
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indicating its basic irrelevance to the question.
Westerners generally favored the issue and easterners
split evenly.

Conclusions at this point would indicate

that Republicans, northerners, and westerners (in that
order) supported the territories, while Democrats,
southerners, and easterners opposed them.

TABLE 2
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION
STATEHOOD ISSUE

NORTH
DIVISIONIST

122

SOUTH

( 69%)

MODERATE

11

(

ANTI-STATEHOOD

44

( 25%)

TOTAL

177

6%)

(100%)

WEST
DIVISIONIST
MODERATE
ANTI-STATEHOOD

30
2
17

( 61%)
(

4%)

( 35%)

11 ( 12%)

1
1

TOTAL

1
1

133 ( 49%)

4%)

1
1

77 ( 84%)

1
1

92 (100%)

1
1
1
1 269 (100%)

4 (

15 (

6%)

121 ( 45%)

EAST

1
1

TOTAL

103 ( 47%)

1
1

133 ( 49%)

6%)

1
1

104 ( 47%)

1
1

13 (

15 (

6%)

121 ( 45%)

1
1

TOTAL

49

(100%)

220 (100%)

1
1

269 (100%)

In order to underscore the partisan nature of the
statehood issue, as indicated in Table 1, Table 3 indi
cates the assignable number of representatives in each
region.

Seventy percent of the northerners were

Republicans, corresponding to the 69 percent northern pro
division vote in Table 2.

The third table also shows 88

percent of the southerners were Democrats, which closely
matches the moderate plus anti-statehood vote in Table
2.

Since we associate Republicans with the pro-division

vote and the Democrats with the anti-statehood vote,
conclusions at this point confirm that the north-south
split is actually a reflection of the RepublicanDemocratic split.

Since most Republicans lived in the

North, naturally the North would favor division; of
course the reverse applies for the South.

The eastern

states, as shown on Table 3, show a relatively even split
as far as party is concerned.

This same statistic is

reflected in Table 2, where the eastern vote is 47
percent for division and 47 percent anti-statehood.
Western states' representatives voted slightly more often
on the pro side, again corresponding to the higher number
of Republicans in the western states.

TABLE 3
TOTAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN RESPECTIVE SECTIONS
WITH BLOC ASSIGNABLE VOTING RECORDS
STATEHOOD ISSUE

NORTH
REPUBLICAN

11 ( 12%)

53

( 30%)

81

/— N

( 70%)

GO
oo

124

'— y

DEMOCRAT

SOUTH

1
1

TOTAL

!

135 ( 50%)

!

134 ( 50%)

177

(100%)

WEST

92 (100%)

! 269

V./

TOTAL

o
o
***

1
1

EAST

1
1

TOTAL

REPUBLICAN

32

( 65%)

103 ( 47%)

!

135 ( 50%)

DEMOCRAT

17

( 35%)

117 ( 53%)

!

134 ( 50%)

1
1
TOTAL

49

(100%)

220 (100%)

! 269 (100%)

Table 4 further emphasizes Republican favor for
statehood and Democratic opposition.

Sectionalism was

hardly a factor concerning the territories.

As reflected

in Table 4, eastern Republicans, with 99 percent; western
Republicans, with 94 percent; southern Republicans, with
100 percent; and northern Republican, with 98 percent;
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TABLE 4
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION, CONTROLLING FOR PARTY
STATEHOOD ISSUE

1
1

DEMOCRATS
WESTERN

EASTERN

1
1

1 (

1%)

1
1

TOTAL

DIVISION 1ST

0

(

0%)

MODERATE

1

(

6%)

13 ( 11%)

1
1

14 ( 10%)

( 94%)

103 ( 88%)

1
1

119 ( 89%)

ANTI-STATEHOOD

16

1 (

1%)

1
1
TOTAL

17

(100%)

117 (100%)

DIVISIONIST

30

EASTERN

( 94%)

134 (100%)

1
1

REPUBLICANS
WESTERN

1
1

102 ( 99%)

1
1
1
1

TOTAL
132 ( 98%)

MODERATE

1

(

3%)

0 (

0%)

1
1

1 (

1%)

ANTI-STATEHOOD

1

(

3%)

1 (

1%)

1
1
1
1

2 (

1%)

103 (100%)

1
1

TOTAL

32

(100%)

135 (100%)

TABLE 4 (Continued)

1
1

DEMOCRATS

DIVISIONIST

1

(

2%)

0 (

0%)

1

4 (

5%)

1
1

77 ( 95%)

1
1

MODERATE

10

( 19%)

STATEHOOD

42

( 79%)

1

TOTAL
1 (
14

1%)
6%
O

1
1

s_'

SOUTHERN

NORTHERN

119 ( 89%)

1
1

TOTAL

53

(100%)

81 (100%)

1
1

134 (100%)

1
1

NORTHERN
121

( 98%)

11 (100%)

1
1

132

o\

DIVISIONIST

TOTAL
CO

SOUTHERN

1
1
1
1

REPUBLICANS

MODERATE

1

(

1%)

0 (

0%)

1
1

1 (

1%)

ANTI-STATEHOOD

2

(

1%)

0 (

0%)

1
1

2 (

1%)

1
1
TOTAL
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(100%)

all favored statehood.

11 (100%)

1
1

135 (100%)

On the opposite side, Democrats

in the east, west, south and north voted against it, with
somewhat less unanimity.

It made no difference whether a

member was from the north, south, east or west.

His vote

shows his political affiliation was more important than
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his sectional ties, underlining the partisan nature of
the statehood question in an era when House and Senate
majorities were often very narrow and each new Senator or
Representative might change the complexion of Congress by
altering the balance of party control.

In the Fiftieth

Congress, in which Harrison served on the Committee of
the Territories (not as Chairman, as he did in the Fortyninth Congress) the Republicans controlled the Senate by
only 39 to 37.

No wonder Democrats were suspicious of
p
the political leanings of new states!
Originally, I believed there would be some signifi
cant sectional split, especially east-west.

Since the

territories were located near the western states, I
assumed the latter would feel some sympathy for the
plight of their neighbors.

However, roll call analysis

confirms that a westerner voted his party line.

This

proved to be one of the most revealing aspects of my
findings.

Many times the members would state they were

fellow westerners, and therefore in complete accord with
the territories' efforts.

Nevertheless, when the time

came for the vote to be cast, their western pride turned
to partisan obedience.

One would also have expected that

easterners would be skeptical about the admission of four
new western states at once, for it would have the effect
of further diluting their political power.

This eastern

reluctance to promote western expansion had been present
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from the early days of the Republic.

Perhaps easterners

were resigned to the fact that this process would con
tinue until all territories had become states; perhaps,
also, their instinct for party survival was simply
stronger than their sectional feelings.
Furthermore, and almost as significant, the Omnibus
Bill, admitting North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
Washington, followed party lines even more strictly than
the historiography of the period (which claims support,
not unanimity) has implied.

As pointed out earlier in

this paper, it was ironic that the political party
responsible for barring statehood for Dakota was indeed
the same party that ended up granting the same in the
end.

Democrats, originally the strongest opponents of

the admission of Dakota as a state, changed from total
non-support to acceptance of a single-state plan.

After

the Republicans were unwilling to back down from their
original dual-statehood proposition, sufficient Democrats
finally agreed to this as well.

Springer, one of the

strongest Democrats, actually formulated the Omnibus
Bill.

His support, along with that of other Democrats,

was only there at the last minute when they realized they
had no other alternative.

Democrats were indeed holding

up statehood for the territories.

Political control of

the House of Representatives meant more to them than
unenfranchised citizens.

Dakota Territory was ready and
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willing to become a state ten years prior to admission,
but it had to wait until the Democrats were forced into
the position of either fighting or joining a statehood
movement which, after the 1888 national election, was
clearly going to be successful.
A further study was conducted to investigate to what
extent partisanship played a role in entire Congress of
1888-1889, both the House and the Senate.

Using the

identical program utilized to track the Dakota statehood
issue in the second session of the Fiftieth Congress, and
cluster-bloc analysis, I carefully analyzed the results
of the pairwise comparisons of all voting that occurred
in both sessions of the Fiftieth Congress.

Since I had

found partisan voting was the normal way of conducting
business when I experimented with the statehood issue, I
assumed the same would apply to other issues which passed
through Congress.

The results were predictable, yet

surprising in their degree of agreement.

Again to state

the criteria of the blocs: in order to become a member of
a bloc, a congressman must vote the same as all other
members of the bloc on at least eighty percent of the
roll calls.

It is obvious from this statement that they

did not vote exactly the same on each and every issue.
However, it should be pointed out that eighty percent
agreement is remarkable, considering the diversity and
complexity of Congress.

123

TABLE 5
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY PARTY, 50TH CONGRESS
TOTAL BUSINESS

REPUBLICAN

DEMOCRATIC

CONGRESSMEN

CONGRESSMEN

TOTAL

REPUBLICAN
BLOC-POSITION

154 ( 98.7%)

9 (

5.4%)

163 ( 50.5%)

158 ( 94.6%)

160 ( 49.5%)

167

323

DEMOCRAT
BLOC-POSITION

TOTAL

2 (

1 . 3 %)

156 (100.0%)

( 1 0 0 . 0 %)

( 1 0 0 . 0 %)

The House of Representatives of the Fiftieth
Congress contained 323 members (156 Republicans, 167
Democrats) in the 1888-1889 session, and they voted on a
total of 320 roll calls (see Table 5 above).

Using the

cluster-bloc program, the group broke into two very
distinct groups, directly along party lines.

Beginning

with the Democrats, only nine members (5.4 percent) voted
with the Republican bloc.

Basically, the Democrats voted

cohesively on all of the isues brought before the House;
however, they do not belong to "a" bloc with as much
certainty as I found on the statehood question.

They

fragmented more within the bloc into sub-blocs or mini
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blocs, yet all voting a basic Democratic line.

The

Republicans, on the other hand, formed a solid group.
Only two members (1.3 percent) voted with the Democrats
at all.

The Republicans’ degree of agreement was also

much higher, the majority of them paring with each other
at 80 percent or more.

Again, this group was, to some

degree, less well defined than the corresponding bloc on
the Dakota issue.

It is of interest to note that both

parties were able to command the solid allegiance of
their rank and file in the House, for they voted with
each other and not with the opposite party, at least at
the 80 percent level used to define a voting bloc.

The

House of Representatives of the Fiftieth Congress was
conclusively a partisan group of voting members, much
more so than in our own time.
It should be noted that such intense partisanship
also meant that a small group of as few as fifteen men
could have a decisive role in the final vote.

It was

apparent that the statehood issue, although always firmly
supported by the Republican party, finally was brought in
by the House whose majority was Democratic.

It was the

action of a small group of Democrats who finally voted
for the statehood bill, determining the final result.
The motivation of these men is now lost to time; however,
one can speculate that they either were men of convic
tion, willing to put aside the party voice, or, acting on
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orders from the Democratic party, they were perhaps
realistic about the fact that Republicans would bring in
new territories regardless what they did in this
Congress.

In any case, the statehood issue was deter

mined by this small group of Democrats.
Similarly, the Senate's complexion proved no less
partisan.
members.

The Senate of the Fiftieth Congress had 77
The political breakdown was about even, with 37

Democrats and 39 Republicans.

The Senate voted on 389

roll calls in the 1888-1889 session.

It is striking to

discover that like the House, it broke into two blocs
along strict party lines.

The matrix, with its text-book

archetype, is perfectly set, with the 37 Democrats voting
together in one bloc, and the 39 Republicans voting in
the other bloc.
character.

The Senate was decisively partisan in

It voted according to party standing on all

of the issues regardless of content or apparent personal
reflection.

It can only be speculation whether or not

the party dictated the vote on a particular issue;
however, it would be most remarkable if each and every
member of either the Republican or Democratic party were
absolutely devoted members with identical beliefs and
convictions.
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^Because fringe members only voted with their bloc
70 per cent of the time, they have been eliminated from
the following statistics. The complete list of all blocs
and fringes may be found in Appendix 3.
2
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistic
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington,
D.C.: IT ST Government Printing Office, 19^0), p. 691.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

The objective of this thesis was to discover the
reasons why statehood for Dakota Territory took twentyeight years to accomplish.

I found there were several

issues in the territorial period that delayed statehood,
including bond repudiation, an effort to change the
constitution after its submission to Congress and
approval by the Senate, the efforts of Governor Ordway to
keep Dakota under his control, and uncertain results of
key referendums.
enemy.

Dakota was, at times, its own worst

Splitting into fragmented groups, it often did

not have a comprehensive and organized program to
follow.

This apparent disorganization was viewed in

Washington with apathy, causing politicans to ignore the
distant territory.

In addition, the territory was insist

ent that it wanted to enter the Union as two states and
not one large, clumsy state.

This too caused delay, as

it was somewhat out of the ordinary to split territories
into more than one state, both of which would be admitted
immediately.
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Washington politicans were also partially to blame
for the long delays.

The House and Senate were

controlled by the same party only for a short time after
1875, leading to an intense partisan struggle over the
territories between the Republicans and the Democrats.
The Republicans were supportive of the Territory of
Dakota and were willing to bring it into the Union by
1886.

The Democrats, on the other hand, blocked

statehood time and time again.

The key to the entire

issue was partisan politics, leading to constant and
extended delay.

Dakotans were delayed by their own

disorganization, they were delayed by politics of their
era, and they were delayed by one political party, the
Democrats.

It is no surprise that the statehood movement

was riddled with problems the entire time.
My hypothesis was correct in attributing to the
Democratic Party the long delay in statehood for Dakota.
Even though this point was strongly supported by the
historiography of the period and by modern historians,
this study carries this fact one step further.

I found

that it was indeed true that Democrats were unreceptive
towards the territory and chose to ignore it for many
years.

Nevertheless, they were the party which finally

brought Dakota into the Union in 1889.
At this point cluster bloc analysis was especially
useful.

I have noted that on occasion a legislator’s
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opinion as expressed in his speeches was not reflected in
his voting record.

One could not determine exactly who

supported North Dakota statehood and who did not, simply
by looking at the vote on final passage, for that was a
voice vote.

Furthermore, most of the roll calls really

involved more than one question; the simplified discus
sion in the text and appendix 2 does not reflect that.
There were, in fact, no single roll call issues that were
clearly indicative of support for North Dakota and no
other issue, although there were two clear-cut votes on
the New Mexico issue, which might help some other
historian.

By comparing voting behavior on a number of

issue-related roll calls, however, I could pinpoint
congressmen whose attitudes were Divisionist, Moderate,
or opposed to immediate statehood for North Dakota.
For example, Representative Springer led Democrats
in the House of Representives in the fight to pass the
Omnibus Bill, which would have admitted North Dakota
promptly.

But when the votes were counted, Springer was

sometimes found in the Anti-Statehood block.

How is this

to be explained?
First of all, many of the key votes on the Omnibus
Bill were voice votes; they must remain outside our
scope.

Also, Springer was not in the Moderate Block of

Democrats because (like the vast majority of Democrats)
he was not as willing as the Moderates were to vote with
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Republicans on all of the various parliamentary maneuvers
prior to passage of the Omnibus Bill, nor was he willing
to grant more than a two-state advantage to the
Republicans.

Note in Appendix 2, which lists the twelve

relevant roll calls, that some of them are procedural and
none of them is a vote on final passage.

Springer was

determined to have some bill passed under the sponsorship
of the Democrats.

With the help of the bloc of fifteen,

the Moderates, all Democrats except one Independent
Republican, he succeeded.

In January 1889, Springer

secured the passage of his substitute in the House; this
bill provided for the division of Dakota Territory and
the prompt entry of North Dakota and the other states
into the Union.

The fifteen Moderates supported him in

this effort and, in four of the five roll calls
pertaining to the issue, they provided the margin of
victory.

(The four fringe Moderates, all Democrats, were

also supportive).
Once his substitute became the House bill, however,
Springer and the Moderates were no longer in agreement.
On six of the remaining seven roll calls, Moderates
opposed Springer (on the roll call number ten only five
Moderates voted, and they were split).

The Democratic

leader fought to bring in New Mexico, which would have
been a Democratic state.

The Moderates opposed him,
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evidently in the belief that insistence on the New Mexico
question would endanger the entire package.
The Moderates voted against Springer and their party
in February 1889.
classify.

These roll calls are more difficult to

Two were votes to adjourn, and the moderates

split on one of them.

But this small bloc seems to have

been more insistent than Springer and the other Democrats
that South Dakota should come in with the Sioux Falls
Constitution of 1885 if it wished, and that North Dakota
be admitted without delay due to submission of the
division question to a local referendum or due to any
further required action by Congress.

Perhaps this is

indicative of a commitment to democratic ideals; perhaps
it indicates pragmatic acceptance of the political power
of the Republican Party.

The Moderates were not the

swing vote on these roll calls, but the fourteen
Democratic Moderates who were present and voting did vote
against their own party leadership.
It was interesting to discover the inner workings of
the Democratic Party at that time.

My research indicates

that from 1861 to 1886, Democrats were adamantly opposed
to bringing in any new states.

However, in December

1886, Springer first introduced the Omnibus Bill, which
indicated a change in Democratic strategy.

The new plan

called for Democratic support of the western territories
and stressed the need to bring not one, but four states
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into the Union.

Activity was intense as the party tried

to make this statehood issue something it could
capitalize on instead of ending up labeled as the party
that did not support the admission of new states.
A great deal of trading went on in the second
session of the Fiftieth Congress, the Senate passing one
bill, which traveled over to the House only to be
rejected, amended, and then returned with variations.
The actual votes in the committees were not recorded in
either the House or the Senate, therefore it was diffi
cult to pinpoint who exactly was supporting certain
issues or bills.

But it is clear that Democrats quickly

realized that if they failed to bring in the states,
including some with Democratic tendencies, the
Republicans would bring in Dakota for sure the following
congressional session, and might leave out altogether the
territories that were Democratic.
Democrats realized that a trade of sorts could be
arranged to guarantee at least some Democratic states.
They never lost sight of their original party goal, which
was to keep out any territories that were not of their
party unless, if all else failed, they must be brought in
by pairs to insure that Republican and Democratic states
joined the Union together.

The last few months of the

Fiftieth Congress saw the emergence of a moderate bloc of
Democrats who, by their presence, softened the issue
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sufficiently to permit statehood for Dakota along with
the other territories.

They apparently wanted to save

something out of the party's inevitable defeat on the
issue.

It was because of their support for division of

Dakota Territory that key votes on the Omnibus Bill
•

permitted North Dakota to receive the necessary
majority.

The Moderate Democrats, even though they were

small in number, actually made statehood possible for
North Dakota, as well as supporting South Dakota,
Montana, and Washington.

It was indeed an ironic twist

in events.
Equally partisan however, the Republicans happened
to be on the correct side of the territorial issue for
Dakota.

They professed for many years that they were

indeed the party of the territories, always willing to go
out on a limb for the unenfranchised citizens.

Again,

knowing the political structure of the parties of the
post-Civil War congresses, one wonders if they would have
been so willing to go to the lengths they did if Dakota
would have been controlled by Democrats.

Probably not,

for Republicans managed to keep out New Mexico, which
would have elected Democrats to Congress.

Republicans

were just as partisan as Democrats were; however, most
historians since statehood have overlooked that fact.
the end, statehood was attained for Dakota partially
because of Republicans laboring to bring in the

In
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territories as soon as possible, and partially because
Democrats did not want to make the territorial issue a
liability in the next election.
The final analysis of the Fiftieth Congress of the
United States proves the hypothesis that the Democratic
Party blocked statehood for Dakota Territory and the
Republican Party tried for many years to assist the terri
tory in joining the Union.

It was quite revealing to

note that political parties had such absolute control
over their members.

With the assistance of cluster bloc

analysis, I was able to indicate the degree to which
Democrats voted with Democrats, following party policy,
and Republicans voted with Republicans.
Voting behavior during the 1888-1889 congressional
year was revealing in two ways.
into two specific party blocs.

First, the House broke
It was rather amazing

that party voting was as strong as it was, considering
323 individuals were represented, indicating about as
close to perfect party alignment as one will ever see.
Second, it was exciting to note to what degree the Senate
also voted along party lines; the blocs were even more
distinct, indicating even greater party loyalty.

As it

turns out, partisanship was truly reflected in the
Fiftieth Congress of the United States.

This is typical

of the voting behavior of Gilded Age congressmen and in
sharp contrast to legislative alignments in a modern
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congress.

Although findings do not indicate 100 percent

adherence to party, evidence nevertheless supports the
contention that Democrats voted solidly with Democrats,
and Republicans with Republicans.
North and South Dakota each called constitutional
conventions during the summer of 1889.

The delegates

agreed on the division line in the territory, disposed of
all common debts and liabilities, divided the public
1
buildings, and separated the respective debt.
Voters
approved both constitutions in October of 1889.2
President Harrison signed the proclamation on November 2,
1889, admitting North and South Dakota to the Union.

He

signed his name to the proper papers without revealing
which state came in first.

Harrison allegedly explained

his action by saying, "they were born together, they were
one, and I will make them twins."3
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1Black, "History of the State Constitutional
Convention of 1889," pp. 128-53, offers a detailed
synopsis of the North Dakota Convention.
^Schell, History of South Dakota, p. 222;
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:410—11. It is
interesting to note that in the election of congressmen
and senators for the Fifty-first Congress, Dakota did
elect all Republican politicians. Biographical
Directory of the American Congress, 1774 — 1971
(Washington, Dl C. : United States Government Printing
Office, 1971), pp. 715, 1000, 1064, 1428, 1535, 1543.
The new members from South Dakota were, Richard F.
Pettigrew, Gideon C. Moody, Oscar S. Gifford, John A.
Pickier. Those from North Dakota included Lyman R.
Casey, Gilbert Pierce, and Henry C. Hansbrough.
^Kingsbury, History of Dakota, 2:1935. In the
years 1889-1890, territories formed in the 1860's were
established as six new states: Washington, Idaho,
Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Elben,
First and Second Empires, p. 6.
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APPENDIX 2
ROLL CALLS ON STATEHOOD ISSUE

The following roll calls were used in the analysis:
1. Measure is an amendment submitted by MacDonald to
Springer's substitute for Senate Bill S. 185, "to provide
for the admission of the State of Dakota into the Union,
and for the organization of the Territory of North
Dakota."
Vote is yea 117, nay 122, not voting 83.
rejected.

Amendment is

Issue is whether Dakota Territory should be divided and
North Dakota admitted immediately with the other states
(Springer), or whether Dakota Territory should be divided
and North Dakota admitted in the future after writing a
constitution and forming a government (MacDonald).
Result is to accept Springer's amendment in the nature
of a substitute, thus proposing to admit North Dakota
immediately.
Congressional Record, p. 93^; Journal, p. 290;
January T"8^ 1889.
2. Measure is an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, offered by Springer to divide Dakota
Territory and admit North Dakota immediately with South
Dakota, Montana, Washington, and New Mexico.
Vote is yea 133, nay 120, not voting 69.
rejected.

Amendment is

Issue is whether Dakota Territory should be divided and
North Dakota admitted immediately with South Dakota,
Montana, Washington, and New Mexico (Springer), or
whether Dakota Territory should be divided and North
Dakota admitted in the future after writing a
constitution and forming a government (Senate bill).
Result is to accept Springer's amendment in the nature
of a substitute, thus proposing to admit North Dakota
immediately.
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Congressional Record, p. 949; Journal, p. 293;
January TS^ 1889*
3. Measure is motion by Baker to recommit the bill,
which is now Springer’s substitute, with instructions to
report separate bills admitting South Dakota and proving
enabling acts for North Dakota, Montana, and Washington.
Vote is yea 118, nay 131, not voting 73.
rejected .

Motion is

Issue is whether Dakota Territory should be divided and
North Dakota admitted immediately with South Dakota,
Montana, Washington, and New Mexico (Springer), or
whether Dakota Territory should be divided and North
Dakota admitted in the future after writing a constitu
tion and forming a government (Baker).
Result is to continue consideration of Springer’s
amendment in the nature of a substitute, thus proposing
to admit North Dakota immediately.
Congressional Record, p. 950; Journal, p. 295;
January i”8"j 18894. Measure is to pass the bill, which is now Springer's
substitute .
Vote is yea 145, nay 98, not voting 79.
passed.

Bill is

Issue is whether to pass the bill in the form of the
Springer amendment (which divides Dakota Territory and
admits North Dakota immediately with South Dakota,
Montana, Washington, and New Mexico), or to deliberate
further the original Senate version (which divides Dakota
Territory and admits North Dakota in the future after
writing a constitution and forming a government).
Result is to pass the bill, thus proposing to admit
North Dakota immediately.
Congressional Record, p. 951; Journal, p. 296;
January TlTj 1889.
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5. Measure is the preamble to the bill, referring to the
desire of the people of South Dakota to be admitted under
the constitution adopted in 1885.
Vote is yea 91, nay 108, not voting 123.
rejected.

Preamble is

Issue is whether to revise the preamble to include
referenced to the 1885 constitution for South Dakota.
Result is to omit reference to the 1885 constitution
for South Dakota in the preamble.
Congressional Record, p. 952; Journal, p. 297;
January ilTJ 1889.
6. Measure is to accept that portion of the report of
the Conference Committee that recomme nds that New Mexico
be excluded from the bill. •
Vot e is yea 135, nay 105,, not voting 83. That portion
of the Conference Committee report is accepted.
Issue is whether to admit New Mexico to statehood,
Result is to refuse statehood to New Mexico.
Congressional Record, p. 1912; Journal, p. 497;
February
1889.
7.

Measure is to table a motion to reconsider item six.

Vote is yea 136, nay 109, not voting 77.
reconsider is tabled.

Motion to

Issue is whether to admit New Mexico to statehood.
Result is to refuse statehood to New Mexico.
Congressional Record, p. 1913; Journal, p. 499;
February
1889.
8. Measure is Mr. Cox’s motion to accept that portion of
the report of the Conference Committee that South Dakota
be admitted under the Sioux Falls constitution if the
voters approve it, and that portion of the report of the
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Conference Committee that provides a referendum on the
constitution but not on division of the territory.
Vote is yea 137, nay 103, not voting 82.
accepted.

Motion is

Issue is whether to resubmit the South Dakota
constitution to the voters, and whether to permit the
division of Dakota Territory without further voter
approval.
Result is that South Dakota's admission under the Sioux
Falls constitution is approved if the voters desire it,
and Dakota Territory will be divided without further
voter approval.
Congressional Record, p. 1913; Journal, p. 500;
February Hi” 1889.
9.

Measure is a motion to adjourn the House.

Vote is yea 82, nay 143, not voting 97defeated .

Motion is

Issue is whether to continue deliberation on the
Conference Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Result is to continue deliberation on the Conference
Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Congressional Record, p. 1914; Journal, p. 501;
February TTj 186910.

Measure is a motion to adjourn the House.

Vote is yea 86, nay 120, not voting 116.
defeated.

Motion is

Issue is whether to continue deliberation on the
Conference Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Result is to continue deliberation on the Conference
Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Congressional Record, p . 1915; Journal, p. 502;
February 14, 1889.
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11. Measure is a motion to reconsider item eight and to
table it.
Vote is yea 145, nay 110, not voting 57.
tabled.

Motion is

Issue is whether to resubmit the South Dakota
consitution to the voters, and whether to permit the
division of Dakota Territory without further voter
approval.
Result is that South Dakota’s admisson under the Sioux
Falls constitution is approved if the voters desire it,
and Dakota Territory will be divided without further
voter approval.
Congressional Record, p. 1939; Journal, p. 508;
February V5] 1889.
12. Measure is motion that North Dakota, Montana, and
Washington be admitted on the same basis and by
proclamation of the President.
Vote is yea 135, nay 105, not voting 83.
accepted.

The motion is

Issue is whether North Dakota, Montana, and Washington
shall be admitted by Presidential proclamation or after
congressional approval.
Result is that North Dakota, Montana, and Washington
shall not be required to risk further delay at the hands
of Congress.
Congressional Record, p. 1940; Journal, p. 510;
February Vb~, 1889.

APPENDIX 3
BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON 12 ROLL CALLS, 50th CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION
BLOC 1
Representatives
Adams
A lien
Allen
Anderson
Arnold
Atkinson
Baker
Bayne
Belden
Bingham
Boothman
Bound
Boutelle
Bowden
Brewer
Brower
Brown
Brown
Browne
Buchanan
Burrows
Butler
Butterworth
Cannon
Caswell
Cheadle
Clark
Cogswell
Conger
Cooper
Crouse
Cutcheon
Dalzell
Morrill
Dariington
Davis
Delano
Dingley
Dorsey
Dunham
F arquhar
F indlay
Flood
F ord
Fuller
F unston
Gaines
Gallinger

Party-State
R-IL
R-MS
R-MC
R-KA
R-RI
R-PA
I-NY
R-PA
R-NY
R-PA
R-OH
R-PA
R-ME
R-VA
R-MC
R-NC
R-OH
R-VA
R-IN
R-N J
R-MC
R-TN
R-OH
R-IL
R-WS
R-IN
R-WS
R-MS
R-IA
R-OH
R-OH
R-MC
R-PA
R-KA
R-PA
R-MS
R-NY
R-ME
R-NB
R-IL
R-NY
R-KY
R-NY
D-MC
R-IA
R-KA
R-VA
R-NH

Gest
Grosvenor
Grout
Guenther
Harmer
Haugen
Hayden
Henderson
Henderson
Hermann
Hiestand
Hires
Hitt
Holmes
Hopkins
Hopkins
Hunter
Jackson
Johnston
Kean
Kelly
Kennedy
Kerr
Ketcham
Laidlaw
LaFollette
Lehlback
Lind
Lodge
Long
McComas
McCormick
McCullough
McKenna
McKinely
Milliken
Mof fitt
Morrill
Nelson
Nichols
0 'Donnell
0 'Neil
Osborne
Owen
Parker
Patton
Payson
Perkins
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R-IL
R-OH
R-VT
R-WS
R-PA
R-WS
R-MS
R-IA
R-IL
R-OR
R-PA
R-N J
R-IL
R-IA
R-IL
R-NY
R-KY
R-PA
R-ID
R-N J
R-PA
R-OH
R-IA
R-NY
R-NY
R-WS
R-N J
R-MN
R-MS
R-MS
R-MD
R-PA
R-PA
R-CA
R-OH
R-ME
R-NY
R-KA
R-MN
R-NC
R-MC
R-PA
R-PA
R-MC
R-NY
R-PA
R-IL
R-KA

BLOC 1
Representative s

Peters
Phelps
Plumb
Posey
Post
Pugsley
Reed
Rockwell
Romei s
Rowell
Russell
Ryan
Sawyer
Scull
Seymour
Sherman
Spooner
Steele
Stephenson
Stewart
Strubble
Symes
Taylor, E.
Taylor, J.
Thomas
Thomas
Thomas
Thompson
Turner
Vandever
Wade
Weber
White
Whiting
Wickham
Williams
Woodburn

Par ty-State
R-KA
R-NJ
R-IL
R-IN
R-IL
R-OH
R-ME
R-MS
R-OH
R-IL
R-CT
R-KA
R-NY
R-PA
R-MC
R-NY
R-RI
R-ID
R-OH
R-VT
R-IA
R-CO
R-OH
R-OH
R-KY
R-IL
R-WS
R-OH
R-KA
R-CA
R-MO
R-NY
R-NY
R-MS
R-MS
R-OH
R-NV

U6
FRINGE-BLOC 1
Representatives_______________ Party-State
Baker
Biggs
Warner
White
Wilber
Yardley

R-IL
D-CA
R-MO
R-IL
R-NY
R-PA

BLOC 2
Representatives________________ Party-State

Anderson
Bliss
Cox
Dargan
Morse
Perry
Phelan
Russell
Shively
Sowden
Thompson
Tillman
Townshend
Vance
Yoder

I-IA*
D-NY
D-NY
D-SC
D-MS
D-SC
D-TN
D-MS
D-IN
D-PA
D-CA
D-SC
D-IL
D-CT
D-OH

independent Republican
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FRINGE-BLOC 2
Representative
Chipman
Ermentrout
MacDonald
Tar sney

Party-State
D-MC
D-PA
D-MN
D-MC
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BLOC 3
Representatives
Abbott
Anderson
Anderson
Bacon
Bankhead
Barnes
Barry
Blanchard
Bland
Blount
Breckinridge
Buckalew
Bynum
Campbell, F.
Campbell
Campbell, T.
Candler
Carleton
Caruth
Cathings
Clardy
Clements
Cobb
Compton
Cothran
Cowles
Crain
Crisp
Culberson
Cummings
Davidson
Davidson
Dibble
Dockery
Dougherty
Dunn
Elliott
Enloe
Ermentrout
F isher
Foran
Forney
French
Gibson
Glass
Grimes
Hall

Par ty-State
D-TX
D-IL
D-MI
D-NY
D-AL
D-GA
D-MI
D-LA
D-MO
D-GA
D-KY
D-PA
D-ID
D-NY
D-OH
D-NY
D-GA
D-GA
D-KY
D-MI
D-MO
D-GA
D-AL
D-MD
D-SC
D-NC
D-TX
D-GA
D-TX
D-NY
D-AL
D-FL
D-SC
D-MO
D-FL
D-AK
D-SC
D-TN
D-PA
D-MC
D-OH
D-AL
D-CT
D-MD
D-TN
D-GA
D-PA

Hare
Hatch
Hayes
Heard
Hemphill
Henderson
Herbert
Holman
Hooker
Hopkins
Howard
Hudd
Hutton
Johnston
Jones
Kilgore
Laffoon
Lagan
Landes
Lane
Lanham
Latham
Lawler
Mai sh
Mansur
Martin
Matson
McAdoo
McClammy
McCreary
McKinney
McMillin
McRae
Merr iman
Mills
Montgomery
Moore
Morgan
Morse
Newton
Norwood
Oates
Oferrall
0 'Neil
Outhwaite
Peel
Randall

D-TX
D-MO
D-IA
D-MO
D-SC
D-NC
D-AL
D-ID
D-MI
I-VA
D-IN
D-WS
D-MO
D-NC
D-AL
D-TX
D-KY
D-LA
D-IL
D-IL
D-TX
D-NC
D-IL
D-PA
D-MO
D-TX
D-IN
D-N J
D-NC
D-KY
R-NH
D-TN
D-AK
D-NY
D-TX
D-KY
D-TX
D-MI
D-MS
D-LA
D-GA
D-AL
D-VA
D-MO
D-OH
D-AK
D-PA
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BLOC 3
Representative s

Rice
Richardson
Robertson
Rogers
Sayers
Seney
Shaw
Smith
Spinola
Spr inger
Stewart
Stewart
Stockdale
Stone
Stone
Taulbee
Tillman
Townshend
Tracy
Turner
Walker
Washington
Weaver
Wheeler
Wilkinson
Wilson
Wilson

Party-State
D-MN
D-TN
D-LA
D-AK
D-TX
D-OH
D-MD
R-WS
D-NY
D-IL
D-GA
D-TX
D-MI
D-KY
D-MO
D-GA
D-SC
D-IL
D-NY
D-GA
D-MO
D-TN
D-IA
D-AL
D-LA
D-WV
D-MN
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FRINGE-BLOC 3
Representatives
0 ’Neall
Penington
Perry
Phalan
Pidcock
Rowland
Rusk
Scott
Simmons
Wise

Party-State
D-IN
D-DL
D-SC
D-TN
D-N J
D-NC
D-MD
D-PA
D-NC
D-VA

APPENDIX 4
HOUSE MEMBERS EXCLUDED FROM ANALYSIS

The following members of the house of Repre sentatives
have not been included in the analysis beca use of an
insufficient voting record.
Allen, John Mills
Belmont, Perry
Bowen, Henry
Breckinridge, Clifton
Browne, Thomas
Brumm, Charles
Bryce, Lloyd
Bunnell, Frank
Burnes, James
Brunett, Edward
Cockran, W. Bourke
Collins, Patrick
Davenport, Ira
Felton, Charles
Fitch, Ashbel
Gay, Edward
Glover, John
Goff, Nathan
Granger, Miles
Greenman, Edward
Hogg, Charles
Houk, Leonidas
Hovey, Alvin
Laird, James
Lee, William
Lyman, Joseph
Lynch, John
Mattett, James
Mahoney, Peter
Mason, William
McShane, John
Morrow, William
Neal, John
Nutting, Newton
Rayner, Isidor
Snyder, Charles
Stahlnecker, William
West, George
Whiting, Justin
Witthorne, Washington
Wilkins, Beriah
Yost, Jacob

MI(D)
NY (D )
VA (R )
AR (D)
VA (R )
PA (R )
NY (D)
PA (R )
MO (D)
MA (D)
NY (D)
MA (D)
NY(R )
CA (R )
NY(R )
LA (D)
MO (D)
WV (R )
CT (D )
NY (D)
WV (D)
TN (R )
IN (R )
NE (R )
VA (D)
IA (R )
PA (D)
PA (R )
NY (D )
IL (R )
NE (D )
CA (R )
TN (D )
NY(R )
MD (D)
WV (D )
NY (D )
NY (R )
MI (D)
TN (D)
OH (D )
VA (R )

Total of 42 Representatives
152

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES
MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS
Grand Forks, N. D. University of North Dakota.
Territorial Papers (microfilm).

Dakota

Washington, D. C. Library of Congress. Manuscript
Division. Benjamin Harrison Papers (microfilm).
U. S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
An Act Establishing the Territorial Government of
Wisconsin. Statutes at Large, vol. 5 (18 3 6 ).
An Act Further to Regulate the Territories of the
United States, and Their Electing Delegates to
Congress. Statutes at Large, vol. 3 (1817).
An Act to Encourage the Growth of Timber on the Western
Prairies. Statutes at Large, vol. 20 (1878).
An Act to Encourage the Growth of Timber on Western
Prairies. Statutes at Large, vol. 17 (1873).
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for
the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of
Surveyor General Therein. Statutes at Large,
vol. 12 (1861).
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the
Territory of Montana. Statutes at Large, vol. 13
( 1 8 6 4 ).
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the
Territory of Wyoming. Statutes at Large, vol. 15
( 1'86'ST.
An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory
Northwest of the River Ohio. Statutes at Large,
vol. 1 (1789).
An Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the
Public Domain. Statutes at Large, vol. 12
(1862).

Dakota, An Act to Provide Temporary Government for the
Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of
Surveyor-General Therein. Laws of Dakota,
(1862).
Kappler, Charles J. Indian Affairs and Laws and
Treaties. 3 vols. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1904.
’’The Constitution Adopted by the Convention Held at Sioux
Falls, Dakota." Sioux Falls Convention, 1885.
Treaty Between the United States of America, and the
Yancton Tribe of Sioux, or Dacotah Indians.
Concluded at Washington, April 19, 1858. Ratified
by the Senate, February 16, 1859- Proclaimed by the
President of the United States, February 26,
1859. Statutes at Large, vol. 1 1 (1 858).
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistic of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1957.
Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1960.
U.S. Congress. Congressional Globe. 36th-42nd
Congresses. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1861-1873.
U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 43rd-50th
Congresses. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1873-1889.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Territories.
Admission of Dakota. 49th Cong., 1st sess.,
1886. H. Rept. 2578 (serial 2443).
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Territories, View of
the Minority. Admission of Dakota. 49th Cong.,
1st sess., 1886T PL Rpt. 2577 (serial 2442).
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Territories.
Admission of Dakota, Minority Report. 50th Cong.,
1st sess., 1888. H. Rpt. 709 (serial 2600).
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Territories,
Minority Report. Admission of Dakota. 50th
Cong., 1st sess., 18 SS. PL Rept. 1025 (serial
2601 ).
U.S. Congress.
Interior.

House. Report of the Secretary of the
Report of the Governor of Dakota. 48th

156

Cong., 1st sess., 18832191).

H. Ex. Doc. 1 (serial

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Territories.
Admission of Dakota. 49th Cong., 1st sess.,
1886. S. Rpt. 15 (serial 2355).
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Territories.
Admission of Dakota. 50th Cong., 1st sess.,
1888. T. Rept. 75 (serial 2519).
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Territories,
Minority Report. Admission of Dakota. 47th
Cong., 1st sess., 1882. S^ Rept. 271, (serial
2004).
U.S. Congress. Senate.
Protest of Bondholders of
Yankton County, Dakota, Against The Admission of
said Territory as a State. 47th Cong., 1st sess.,
1882. S. Mis. Doc. 68 (1993).
U.S. Supreme Court.
19:393-633.

United States Reports 60 Howard

STATE AND TERRITORIAL DOCUMENTS
Facts About South Dakota: An Official Encyclopedia.
Aberdeen, South Dakota: Commissioner of
Immigration, 1890.
Fourth Biennial Message of the Squatter Governor of
Dakota Territory Delivered at Yankton, Feb. 15,
1877• Yankton, Dakota, 1877.
General Laws, and Memorials and Resolutions of the
Territory of Dakota, Passed at the First Session of
the Legislative Assembly. Yankton, Dakota
Territory:
Josiah C. Trask, 1862.
Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention Held Under an Act of the Legislature at
Sioux Falls, Dakota, September, 1885. A.J.
Edgerton, President, John Cain, Secretary. Sioux
Falls', Dakota: S.T. Clover, 1885.
McClure, P. F. Resources of Dakota. An Official
Publication Compiled by the Commissioner of
Immigration, Under Authority Granted by the
Territorial Legislature. Sioux Falls, Dakota:
n.p., 1887.

157

North Dakota. . . A Few Facts Concerning its Resources
and Advantages. Bismarck, State Commissioner of
Agriculture and Labor, 1892.
North Dakota Blue Book.
1981.

N.p.:

Secretary of State,

Report of the Board of Capitol Commissioners to the
Governor and Legislative Assembly, of the Territory
of Dakota.
January 24, 1885. Bismarck, Dakota:
Fr ibune, 1885.
Second Annual Message of Governor William Jayne
Delivered to the Legistative Assembly of Dakota
Territory, in Joint Convention, on Thursday,
December 19, 1862. Yankton, Dakota Territory:
Kingsbury and Ziebach, Public Printers, 1862.
State Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor. North
Dakota. A Few Facts Concerning its Resources and
Advantages. Bismarck! Tribune^ State Printers and
Binders, T1592.
Statehood for Dakota, Proceedings of the Territorial
Convention Held at the City of Aberdeen, Brown
County, Dakota Territory, December 15, A.D. 1887.
Washington: Gibson Brothers, 1888.
United States of America, State of Minnesota. Grants of
land by Congress, and Charter of the St. Paul and
Pacific and of the First Division of the St. Paul
and Pacific Railroad Companies. General railroad
lines of Minnesota and the Territory of Dakota.
St. Paul: Office of the Pioneer Press Company,
1879.
OTHER PRIMARY DOCUMENTS
Armstrong, Moses K. Centennial Address on Dakota
^
^
“1
A^44 ^^4J
Resources. Delivered at the U.S. Centennial
Exhibition in Philadelphia on Sept. 28, 1876.
Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott & Company, 1876.
V- J. v

X U

&

Bryce, Lord James. The American Commonwealth.
York: The MacMillan Company, 1889.

New

Glatfelter, Dr. Noah M. "Letters from Dakota Territory,
1865." Missouri Historical Society 18 (1962):10449.

Hughes, Charles. Speeches of Benjamin Harrison.
York: U.S. Book Company, 1892.

New

McKee, Thomas Hudson. The National Conventions and
Platforms of All Political Parties 1789 to 1900
Convention, Popular and Electoral Vote. Also the
Political Complexion of both Houses of Congress at
each Biennial Period. Baltimore, Maryland: The
Friedenwald Company, 1900; 3rd ed. St. Clair Shores,
Michigan: Scholarly Press, 1970.
"Organic Act of Dakota Territory." South Dakota
Historical Review 1 (April 1936):167-76.
Packard, Samuel Ware. Dakota, Statement of Facts in
Support of the Protest Made by the Yankton County
Bondholders Against the Admission of Dakota.
N.p., 1882.
Porter, Kirk H. and Johnson, Donald Bruce. National
Party Platforms 1840-1964. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1966.
Shannon, P. C. The State of Dakota: How it May be
Forrned. Replies to the Pamphlet of Hon. Hugh
J. Campbell. U.S. Attorney of Dakota, treating upon
the above subject. Yankton, Dakota Territory:
Herald Printing House, 1883.
Treaty Series, Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other
International Acts of the United States of
America . vol. 2~, (1 931 ), No . 86"!
Ward, Joseph. "The Territorial System of the United
States." Andover Review; A Religious and
Theological Monthly 10 (1888):51-62.
SECONDARY SOURCES
BOOKS
Allen, Albert H. Dakota Imprints 1858-1889. New York:
R.R. Bowker Company, published for the
Bibliographical Society of America, 19^7Anderson, Lee F.; Watts, Meredith W., Jr.; and Wilcox,
Allen R. Legislative Roll-Call Analysis.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.

159

Armstrong, Mose s K. The Early Empire Builders of the
E.W. Porter
Great West. St Paul, Minnesota
1901.
Armstrong, Moses K. History and Resources of Dakota
Montana and Idaho. Yankton, Dakota Territory:
George W Kingsbury, 1866; reprint of original
edition, 1928.
Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American
People. 8th ed. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts Educational Division Meredith Corporation,
1969, 1970.
Beringer, Richard E. Historical Analysis; Comtemporary
Approaches to Clio's Craft. New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1978.
Biographical Directory of the American Congress.
Washington, D. C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1971.
The American Territorial
Bloom, John Porter, ed. _
System
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press,
1973.
Briggs, Harold E. Frontiers of the Northwest: A History
of the Upper Missouri Valley. New York: D.
Appleton-Century Company, 19*10.
Compendium of History and Biography of North Dakota:
Containing a History of North Dakota: Embracing an
Account of Early Explorations, Early Settlement,
Indian Occupancy, Indian History and Traditions,
Territorial and State Organization; a Review of the
Political History; and a Concise History of the
Growth and Development of the State: Also a
Compendium of Biography of North Dakota: Containing
Biographical Sketches of Hundreds of Prominent Old
Settlers and Representative Citizens of the State,
With a Review of Their Life Work; Their Identity
With the Growth and Development of the State;
Reminiscences of Personal History and Pioneer Life
and Other Interesting and Valuable Matter Which
Should be Preserved in History. Chicago: George
A. Ogle and Company, 1900.
Crawford, Lewis F. History of North Dakota. 3 vols.
The American Historical
Chicago and New York:
Society, Inc., 1931.

160

Drache, Hiram. The Day of the Bonanza: A History of
Bonanza Farming in the Red River Valley of the
North. Fargo: North Dakota Institute for
Regional Studies, 1964.
Eblen, Jack Ericson. The First and Second United States
Empires; Governors and Territorial Government, 17841912. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittburgh Press,
TWB.

Farrand, Max. The Legislation of Congress for the
Government of the Organized Territories of the
United States 1789-1895. Newark, N.J.: William
IT. Baker , 16 9 6 .
Federal Writers Project of the Works Progress Administra
tion for the State of North Dakota. North Dakota:
A Guide to the Northern Prairie State. New York:
Oxford University Press, American Guide Series,
1950; reprint ed., St. Clair Shores, Mich:
Scholarly Press, 1976.
Federal Writers Project of the Works Progress Administration. South Dakota: A Guide to the State. 2nd
ed. by M. Lisle Reese. New York: Hastings House
for American Guide Series, 1938.
Gardiner, Dorothy. West of the River.
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1941.

New York:

Goodspeed, Weston Arthur. The Province and the States, A
History of the Province of Louisiana Under France
and Spain, and of the Territories and States of the
United States Formed Therefrom. 7 vols. Madison,
Wisconsin: The Western Historical Association,
1904.
History of the Red River Valley Past and Present. 2
vols. Chicago: C.F. Cooper and Company, 1909.
Hunkins, Ralph V., and Lindsey, John Clark. South Dakota
Its Past, Present, and Future. New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1932.
Jennewein, J. Leonard, and Boorman, Jane, ed. Dakota
Panorama. Mitchell, South Dakota: Dakota
Territory Centennial Commission, 1961.
Karolevitz, Robert F. Challenge: The South Dakota
Story. Sioux Falls: Brevet Press, Inc., 1975.

161

Kingsbury, George W.
vols. Chicago:
1915.

History of Dakota Territory. 2
The S.J. Clarke Publishing Company,

Lamar, Howard Roberts. Dakota Territory 1861-1889.
Study of Frontier Politcs. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1956.

A

Lounsberry, Colonel Clement A. North Dakota History and
People: Outlines of American History. 3 vols.
Chicago: The S.J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1917.
Nelson, Bruce 0. Land of the Dacotahs. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1946.
Pomeroy, Earl Spencer. The Territories and the United
States:
1861-1890. Studies in Colonial
Administration. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press for the American Historical
Association, 1947.
Roads, William.
Recollections of Dakota Territory.
Ft. Pierre, South Dakota: n.p., 1931.
Robinson, Doane. Encyclopedia of South Dakota.
Pierre: By the Author, Will A. Beach Printing
Company, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 1925.
Robinson, Doane. History of South Dakota. 2 vols.
Chicago: B. F. Bowen and Company, 1904.
Robinson, Elwyn B. History of North Dakota.
University of Nebraska Press, 1966.

Lincoln:

Schell, Herbert. History of South Dakota. 3rd ed.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975.
Snow, Alpheus H. The Administration of Dependencies, A
Study of the Evaluation of the Federal Empire, with
Special Reference to American Colonial Problems.
New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker
Press, 1902.
Torrey, Edwin C. Early Days in Dakota. Minneapolis:
Farnham Printing and Stationery Co., 1925.
Turner, Frederick Jackson.
The Frontier in American
History. New York: n.p., 1920.
Waldo, Edna LaMoore. Dakota: An Informal Study of
Territorial Days Gleaned from Contemporary

1 62

Newspapers. Bismarck, ND:
Company, 1932.

Capital Publishing

Webb, Walter Prescott. The Great Plains.
Ginn and Company, 1931.

New York:

Willoughby, William Franklin. Territories and
Dependencies of the United States, Their Government
and Administration. New York: The Century
Company. The American State Series, 1905.
ARTICLES
Albright, Robert Edwin. "Politics and Public Opinion in
the Western Statehood Movement of the 1880's."
Pacific
Historical Review 3 (September 1934):296_
__
Albright, Samuel J. "The First Organized Government of
Dakota." Collections of the Minnesota Historical
Society 8 (1898):129-47.
Black, R. M. "History of the State Constitutional
Convention of 1889." Collections of the State
Historical Society of North Dakota 3 (1910):111—57Briggs, Harold E. "The Great Dakota Boom, 1879 to 1886,"
North Dakota Historical Quarterly 4 (January
1930):80-95.
Burley, R. C. "The Campaign of 1888 in Indiana."
Magazine of History 10 (1914):30—53*

Indiana

Colgrove, Kenneth W. "The Attitude of Congress Toward the
Pioneers of the West from 1789 to 1820." The Iowa
Journal of History and Politics 10 (January 1910):3 —
129Green, Carrol Gardner. "The Struggle of South Dakota to
Become a State." South Dakota Historical
Collections 12 (1924):503-40.
Hedges, James. "The Colonization Work of the Northern
Pacific Railroad." Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 13 (December 1926):329-31•
Henry, Robert S. "The Railroad Land Grant Legend in
American History Texts," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 32 (September 1945):190—98.

163

Libby, Orin G. "The Colonial Period of North Dakota
History." The Quarterly Journal of the University
of North Dakota 14 (June 1924):303-14.
Neil, William M. "The American Territorial System Since
the Civil War: A Summary Analysis." Indiana
Magazine of History 60 (September 1964):219-40.
Owens, Kenneth N. "Pattern and Structure in Western
Territorial Politics." Western Historical Quarterly
(October 1970):373-92.
Paxson, Frederic Logan. "The Admission of the ’Omnibus’
States, 1889-90." WisconsinStateHistorical
Society Proceedings 59 (1911):77-96.
Pomeroy, Earl Spencer. "Carpet-baggers in the
Territories 1861 to 1890." Historian 2 (Winter
1939): 53-64.
Pomeroy, Earl Spencer. "The Territory as a Frontier
Institution."
Historian 7 (Autumn 1944):29—41.
Robinson, Elwyn B. "The Themes of North Dakota History."
North Dakota History 26 (Winter 1959):5-24.
Rose

Margaret. "Manuscript Collections of the State
Historical Society of North Dakota." North Dakota
History 30 (no. 1 1963):17-61.

"The Settlement at Sioux Falls. Collections of the State
Historical Society of South Dakota 6 (1912):133-80.
Schneider, Eugene Curier. "Taxation in Dakota Territory."
South Dakota History Collection 13 (1926):395-424.
Spalding, Burleigh F. "Constitutional Convention, 1889."
North Dakota History 31 (July 1964):151-66.
Unruh, John David. "South Dakota in 1889." Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Texas, 1939.
Wells, Merle W. "Politics in the Panhandle: Opposition
to the Admission of Washington and North Idaho, 1886—
1888." Pacific Northwest Quarterly 46 (July
1955): 79-89.
Wilson, Wesley C. "Doctor Walter A. Burleigh: Dakota
Territorial Delegate to 39th and 40th Congress:

Politician, Extraordinary.”
(Spring 1966):93—104.

North Dakota History 33

Winship, George B. "Early Politics and Politicians of
North Dakota.” Quarterly Journal of the University
of North Dakota 13 (April 1923):254-67.
THESIS
Schlaht, Albert. "Legislative and Political Activities of
the Delegates to Congress from Dakota Territory 1861—
1879." Master's thesis, University of South Dakota,
1934.
PAMPHLET COLLECTIONS, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY
First National Bank of Brunswick, Maine: A.H. Merryman
and 20 Other County Bondholders. A Protest Against
the Admission of Dakota as a State. N.p., 1882.
Opinions of the Press: As to the Propriety of Congress
Admitting Dakota at the Present Time. N.p.,
Protest Against the Admission of Dakota as A State;
Signed the First National Bank of Brunswick, Maine;
A. H. Merryman and 20 Other Bondholders. N.p.,
1882.

